NEGATIVE BRIEF: Nuclear Weapons in Turkey – not a problem

NEGATIVE PHILOSOPHY / ALTERNATIVE STRATEGY / REVERSE PLAN ADVOCACY 3

We should maintain NATO nuclear weapons until Russia negotiates mutual reductions, and then set a goal of removing ALL nukes from NATO 3

Nuclear weapons should be reduced in small steps, without destabilizing alliances - Like Status Quo policy 3

HARMS 3

NATO nukes don’t violate NPT (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 3

SOLVENCY 4

No Non-Proliferation Benefit: Proliferators ignored other nuclear weapons reductions, they will ignore NATO too 4

Remove now / Deploy later during a crisis: Won’t deter, won’t happen, would be destabilizing 4

Bringing the nukes back in time of crisis isn’t realistic: It would be divisive and could lower the cost of aggression 4

“Use the Asian nuclear guarantee model” - Response: Credibility of that model depends on NATO 5

DISADVANTAGES 5

1. Turkey Develops Its Own Nuclear Weapons 5

Link: Turkey is holding off building its own nuclear weapons only because of US security commitments Brink: US/Turkey/NATO relations are strained, giving importance to nuclear weapons 5

Link: Turkey may develop their own nukes due to worries about Iran 5

Link: Turkey may feel compelled to develop its own nukes if NATO’s are removed 6

Link + Brink: Majority of Turks want Turkey to build its own nuclear weapon 6

Link: Turkey would have motive to seek nuclear weapons of its own 6

Impact: Preventing Turkey from acquiring nuclear weapons is critical to international security 6

2. Sign of weakness 7

Link: Withdrawal of US nukes would send a signal of weakness to Russia 7

Link: Removal of NATO nukes won’t have positive impact on Russia - could even be a sign of weakness 7

Impact: American interests undermined and millions of people affected by Russia's behavior in response to US weakness. Example: Russian invasion of Georgia 7

3. Lost Deterrence 8

Link: Removal of NATO nukes would create a net loss of deterrence 8

Link: Nuclear weapons are better at deterrence than conventional 8

Link: NATO nukes deter by making the risk of attack on NATO far outweigh any possible gain 8

Impact: Reverse Plan Advocacy - Deterrence value of NATO nukes justifies keeping Status Quo 8

Impact: Need NATO nukes to deter threats from Russia and Iran 9

4. Lose focus on the real problem 9

Link: NATO tactical nuclear weapons focus distracts us from the real issue: World stability with expanding club of nuclear nations 9

Impact: Net benefits: Nuclear disarmament would produce at best marginal benefits, and more often it's harmful 9

Impact: Proliferation = increased risk of nuclear war 9

5. Broken Umbrella Leading to Russian Coercion 10

Link: We need as many NATO members as possible hosting nuclear weapons. If not, it becomes difficult to convince NATO states to provide nuclear umbrella over non-nuclear partners 10

Link: US nuclear capabilities are essential to prevent nuclear coercion by Moscow 10

Link: Russia is increasing its non-strategic nuclear forces 10

Link: US needs to hedge against Russia's nuclear threats to coerce its neighbors 11

Link: Russia has opened up new possibilities of using or threatening nuclear weapons in regional conflicts 11

Brink: Russia's coercion of its neighbors is a looming flash point 11

Impact: Threatens important US & European interests; tens of billions of dollars at stake 11

6. Loss of NATO solidarity 12

Link: Removal of NATO nukes would lead to corrosive debate and division within NATO 12

Link: Affirmative doesn't consult with NATO allies, it's unilateral US action 12

Link: NATO solidarity rests on the principle of sharing the defense burden, including nuclear weapons 12

Link: Have to find consensus about nuclear weapons in NATO, else it could become a source of contention 13

Link: Without solidarity NATO will not survive 13

Impact: WMD’s and Terrorism. Europe without NATO would be more vulnerable to Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and terrorism 13

Impact: We need NATO for a more peaceful world 14

ALTERNATE PHILOSOPHY / MINOR REPAIR / COUNTERPLAN LINKS & IDEAS 14

#1: Consult with Allies before we do anything 14

NATO members do not have a common understanding about risks and threats 14

US should consult with allies about requirements for deterrence and assurance 14

Advocacy: US nuclear forces should not be changed without first consulting with allies 14

#2: Invite Russia to talks about NATO nukes 15

Russia has far more nukes - East European allies want mutual reductions to be negotiated with Russia, not unilateral withdrawal of nukes 15

NEGATIVE BRIEF: Nuclear Weapons in Turkey – not a problem

By Vance Trefethen

**This brief argues against a plan to remove US tactical nuclear weapons currently stationed in Turkey as part of the NATO alliance.**

NEGATIVE PHILOSOPHY / ALTERNATIVE STRATEGY / REVERSE PLAN ADVOCACY

We should maintain NATO nuclear weapons until Russia negotiates mutual reductions, and then set a goal of removing ALL nukes from NATO

Bruno Tertrais 2011. (Senior Research Fellow at the Fondation pour la recherché stratégique of Paris) Defining the Right Mix of Capabilities: The Irreplaceable Role of NATO Nuclear Arrangements, June 2011 Managing Change NATO’s Partnerships and Deterrence in a Globalised World <http://www.nonproliferation.eu/documents/other/natosupremealliedcommandtransformationuniversityofbolognaandistitutoaffariinternazionali4ecb8572a627c.pdf>

The ultimate goal of both deterrence and disarmament is peace and security. NATO should not cling to its current nuclear posture in all possible scenarios. For instance, if Russia were to express a willingness to negotiate the complete dismantlement of its non-strategic forces (those not covered by the bilateral US-Russian arms control treaties), then of course the end of the NATO nuclear arrangements could be put on the table. Today, however, this remains a highly unlikely scenario. Nevertheless, NATO should perhaps consider a new “dual-track” decision by which it expresses its readiness to give up all non-strategic nuclear weapons if Russia is ready to do the same and, conversely, its readiness to modernize its aircraft and weapons in case Moscow refuses.

Nuclear weapons should be reduced in small steps, without destabilizing alliances - Like Status Quo policy

Franklin Miller, George Robertson & Kori Schake 2010. (Franklin Miller is former senior career policy official in the Pentagon and the White House, George Robertson is former NATO secretary-general and former UK defence secretary, and Kori Schake is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution in the US.) Centre for European Reform, GERMANY OPENS PANDORA’S BOX, 8 Feb 2010 <http://www.cer.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/attachments/pdf/2011/bn_pandora_final_8feb10-245.pdf>

Advisors to Chancellor Merkel say that Germany is just doing its part to further President Barack Obama’s policy (the US president has called in early 2009 for a world without nuclear weapons, in order to stop the circle of nuclear powers from expanding). But this is self-serving. Nuclear disarmament, were it to happen, would need to take place in carefully orchestrated moves, which avoid destabilising existing alliances. The US government has proceeded in small steps, focusing initially on reducing strategic nuclear arsenals with Russia.

HARMS

NATO nukes don’t violate NPT (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

Bruno Tertrais 2011. (Senior Research Fellow at the Fondation pour la recherché stratégique of Paris) Defining the Right Mix of Capabilities: The Irreplaceable Role of NATO Nuclear Arrangements, June 2011 Managing Change NATO’s Partnerships and Deterrence in a Globalised World <http://www.nonproliferation.eu/documents/other/natosupremealliedcommandtransformationuniversityofbolognaandistitutoaffariinternazionali4ecb8572a627c.pdf>

As far as the NPT is concerned, nuclear sharing existed before the Treaty was signed, and it was stipulated that US weapons would remain under American control until the very last moment.

SOLVENCY

No Non-Proliferation Benefit: Proliferators ignored other nuclear weapons reductions, they will ignore NATO too

Bruno Tertrais 2011. (Senior Research Fellow at the Fondation pour la recherché stratégique of Paris) Defining the Right Mix of Capabilities: The Irreplaceable Role of NATO Nuclear Arrangements, June 2011 Managing Change NATO’s Partnerships and Deterrence in a Globalised World <http://www.nonproliferation.eu/documents/other/natosupremealliedcommandtransformationuniversityofbolognaandistitutoaffariinternazionali4ecb8572a627c.pdf>

There are few, if any, reasons to believe that the unilateral withdrawal of US nuclear weapons – or a significant reduction of the existing Europe-based arsenal – would have any measurable non-proliferation and disarmament benefit. In the past fifteen years, the massive nuclear reductions undertaken by the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom and France have had no apparent impact on nuclear proliferation dynamics and the non-proliferation regime. India, Iran, Israel, Libya, North Korea and Syria were obviously not impressed. And the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) countries have not shown any interest in seriously reinforcing the regime.

Remove now / Deploy later during a crisis: Won’t deter, won’t happen, would be destabilizing

Franklin Miller, George Robertson & Kori Schake 2010. (Franklin Miller is former senior career policy official in the Pentagon and the White House, George Robertson is former NATO secretary-general and former UK defence secretary, and Kori Schake is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution in the US.) Centre for European Reform, GERMANY OPENS PANDORA’S BOX, 8 Feb 2010 <http://www.cer.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/attachments/pdf/2011/bn_pandora_final_8feb10-245.pdf>

It may be suggested that the alternative to permanent stationing is to ‘remove and deploy’. But a policy of storing nuclear weapons in the US and deploying them to Germany or other NATO countries in times of crisis would be destabilising: Russia would view such deployment as a drastic escalation. For that reason, deployment would be extremely unlikely to occur. This would give enemies every reason to doubt whether the United States would heighten tensions during a crisis by sending nuclear weapons to Europe. Or that a German government in the midst of a crisis would choose to accept them, either for use in defence of a NATO ally or even its own country. To use the clumsy language of NATO communiqués, if the alliance withdrew nuclear weapons from Europe it would make aggression “calculable”. In other words, a potential aggressor could more easily imagine splitting Europe off from the United States.

Bringing the nukes back in time of crisis isn’t realistic: It would be divisive and could lower the cost of aggression

Bruno Tertrais 2011. (Senior Research Fellow at the Fondation pour la recherché stratégique of Paris) Defining the Right Mix of Capabilities: The Irreplaceable Role of NATO Nuclear Arrangements, June 2011 Managing Change NATO’s Partnerships and Deterrence in a Globalised World <http://www.nonproliferation.eu/documents/other/natosupremealliedcommandtransformationuniversityofbolognaandistitutoaffariinternazionali4ecb8572a627c.pdf>

The adoption by NATO of what could be called a new “Turkish Clause” allowing for the return of B-61s in crisis time is not a credible option. This would imply that nuclear-capable aircraft and bases would continue to be certified, and that pilots would continue to be trained for nuclear missions. It is very dubious that NATO would be willing to bear such costs in the absence of real nuclear-sharing. More importantly, such a decision in crisis time would probably open a divisive debate within the Alliance, that would be highly escalatory. This might lower the possible cost of aggression, as cogently argued by a trio of former US and British officials.

“Use the Asian nuclear guarantee model” - Response: Credibility of that model depends on NATO

Bruno Tertrais 2011. (Senior Research Fellow at the Fondation pour la recherché stratégique of Paris) Defining the Right Mix of Capabilities: The Irreplaceable Role of NATO Nuclear Arrangements, June 2011 Managing Change NATO’s Partnerships and Deterrence in a Globalised World <http://www.nonproliferation.eu/documents/other/natosupremealliedcommandtransformationuniversityofbolognaandistitutoaffariinternazionali4ecb8572a627c.pdf>

Note also that the so-called “Asian model” for NATO is an illusion: as the US 2010 Nuclear Posture Review made clear, assurance and deterrence in North-East Asia require that Washington can deploy nuclear forces to the region in time of crisis, but this option is credible only if there are NATO arrangements.

DISADVANTAGES

1. Turkey Develops Its Own Nuclear Weapons

**Link: Turkey is holding off building its own nuclear weapons only because of US security commitments  
Brink: US/Turkey/NATO relations are strained, giving importance to nuclear weapons**

Bruno Tertrais 2011. (Senior Research Fellow at the Fondation pour la recherché stratégique of Paris) Defining the Right Mix of Capabilities: The Irreplaceable Role of NATO Nuclear Arrangements, June 2011 Managing Change NATO’s Partnerships and Deterrence in a Globalised World (ellipses in original) <http://www.nonproliferation.eu/documents/other/natosupremealliedcommandtransformationuniversityofbolognaandistitutoaffariinternazionali4ecb8572a627c.pdf>

As noted by former UK Defense Secretary Des Browne, US weapons are important to Ankara “because the relationship between Turkey, the US and its NATO allies is under strain for other reasons. (…) Turkey is not wedded to US sub-strategic weapons but in the absence of its other concerns being addressed, they have become of symbolic importance”. Likewise, a researcher exploring the likelihood of a Turkish nuclear program recently argued that “it is Turkish faith in the credibility of US security commitments – not the presence of militarily insignificant tactical nuclear weapons on Turkish territory – that helps to constrain Ankara from pursuing nuclear weapons of its own”.

US Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNW) in Europe motivate our allies not to develop their own nuclear weapons

Michaela Dodge 2014. (master of science degree in defense and strategic studies from Missouri State University) U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe: Critical for Transatlantic Security 18 Feb 2014 <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2014/02/us-nuclear-weapons-in-europe-critical-for-transatlantic-security>

For reasons associated with strategic and extended deterrence, the U.S. must not further delay the B61 LEP. Execution of this program is important to sustaining the U.S. science, technology, and engineering base within the nuclear infrastructure complex. U.S. TNWs have dissuaded allies from pursuing their own nuclear weapon capabilities or enlarging their nuclear weapons arsenals. They will continue to serve this important role in the future, as other nations are vigorously modernizing their nuclear weapons arsenals and new nuclear-armed states emerge. U.S. TNWs in Europe are a sign of a visible political commitment to NATO and the security of its members.

Link: Turkey may develop their own nukes due to worries about Iran

Malcolm Chalmers 2010. (Professorial Fellow in British Security Policy at the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies; Professor of Defence and Foreign Policy in the Department of War Studies, Kings College, London) March 2010 NATO's Tactical Nuclear Dilemma <http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/NATOs_Nuclear_Dilemma.pdf>

Finally, critics of a NATO ‘zero option’ point to the critical role that NATO extended nuclear deterrence has played in preventing proliferation within NATO. Today, the development of independent German and Italian nuclear weapons is not a serious possibility. Given current trends in Iran, however, the risk of Turkey moving in this direction cannot be dismissed so easily.

Link: Turkey may feel compelled to develop its own nukes if NATO’s are removed

Franklin Miller, George Robertson & Kori Schake 2010. (Franklin Miller is former senior career policy official in the Pentagon and the White House, George Robertson is former NATO secretary-general and former UK defence secretary, and Kori Schake is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution in the US.) Centre for European Reform, GERMANY OPENS PANDORA’S BOX, 8 Feb 2010 <http://www.cer.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/attachments/pdf/2011/bn_pandora_final_8feb10-245.pdf>

There could scarcely be a worse time to open the nuclear sharing debate in Turkey. Recent revelations of yet another secret Iranian nuclear enrichment plant and the determination by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that the plant constitutes another Non-Proliferation Treaty violation have dramatically raised the stakes for Turkey. Ankara has in recent years pursued a rapprochement with Tehran; the government has been positioning itself as the natural interlocutor between the West and Iran. But Turkey also competes with its neighbour for power in the Muslim world. The possession of nuclear weapons would strengthen Iranian influence throughout the region. Also, the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iran could prompt other Middle Eastern states, such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia, to follow suit. If so, and if NATO’s nuclear guarantee is called into question at the same time, the Turkish government may feel compelled to develop or buy nuclear weapons of its own.

Link + Brink: Majority of Turks want Turkey to build its own nuclear weapon

Baker Spring 2012. ( master’s degree in national security studies from Georgetown University; F.M. Kirby Research Fellow in National Security Policy at The Heritage Foundation) 3 Apr 2012 “Turkish Survey Results Support Heritage Findings,” <http://blog.heritage.org/2012/04/03/turkish-survey-results-support-heritage-findings/>

According to a March 29 article in the *Journal of Turkish Weekly*, 54 percent of Turkish survey respondents favor Turkey developing its own nuclear weapons in response to an Iranian nuclear threat. The alternative provided to the respondents was for Turkey to rely on NATO’s security umbrella. Just 8 percent of the respondents favor the latter option. The survey was conducted by the Centre for Economic and Foreign Policy Studies.

Link: Turkey would have motive to seek nuclear weapons of its own

Franklin Miller, George Robertson & Kori Schake 2010. (Franklin Miller is former senior career policy official in the Pentagon and the White House, George Robertson is former NATO secretary-general and former UK defence secretary, and Kori Schake is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution in the US.) Centre for European Reform, GERMANY OPENS PANDORA’S BOX, 8 Feb 2010 <http://www.cer.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/attachments/pdf/2011/bn_pandora_final_8feb10-245.pdf>

Denied the protection of NATO’s nuclear weapons in Europe, Turkey would have additional reasons to worry about Iran’s nuclear programme – and perhaps to develop nuclear weapons of its own. Newer NATO members in Central Europe, who see in the nuclear weapons a symbol of US commitment to defend them, would be left feeling vulnerable. They are likely to respond by demanding that NATO move its forces and bases, now heavily concentrated in Germany, closer to Russian borders.

Impact: Preventing Turkey from acquiring nuclear weapons is critical to international security

Alexandra Bell and Benjamin Loehrke 2009. ( Bell - project manager at the Ploughshares Fund and a Truman National Security Fellow. Loehrke - research assistant at the Ploughshares Fund and a graduate student at the University of Maryland School of Public Policy) 23 NOVEMBER 2009, BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, The status of U.S. nuclear weapons in Turkey [http://thebulletin.org/status-us-nuclear-weapons-turkey](http://www.google.com/url?q=http%3A%2F%2Fthebulletin.org%2Fstatus-us-nuclear-weapons-turkey&sa=D&sntz=1&usg=AFQjCNFyOjEKyvXHFaZSaav9zOICjGKtOg" \t "_blank)

Preventing Turkey (and any other country in the region) from acquiring nuclear weapons is critical to international security. Doing so requires a key factor that also is essential to paving the way toward withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons: improved alliance relations. The political and strategic compasses are pointing to the eventual withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Europe--it's a strategy that certainly fits the disarmament agenda President Barack Obama has outlined. But to get there, careful diplomacy will be required to improve U.S.-Turkish ties and to assuage Turkish security concerns.

2. Sign of weakness

Link: Withdrawal of US nukes would send a signal of weakness to Russia

Simon Lunn 2010. (Associate Fellow of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies; former Secretary General of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly) Nato’s Tactical Nuclear Dilemma, A Crucial Decision: NATO’s Nuclear Weapons in the Twenty-First Century 2010 <http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/NATOs_Nuclear_Dilemma.pdf>

Other new members made similar comments and leave little room for doubt as to the importance they attach to the presence of American nuclear warheads on European territory. The new members see no reason, therefore, to change existing arrangements. As one said: ‘Why do it? No one will thank you, certainly not the Russians. We may get our weapons out but the Russians never will. So will we be safer or less safe?’ Furthermore, a withdrawal of the warheads would send all the wrong signals. Russia, another ambassador noted, is about power. ‘If you draw down it is a sign of weakening’.

Link: Removal of NATO nukes won’t have positive impact on Russia - could even be a sign of weakness

Bruno Tertrais 2011. (Senior Research Fellow at the Fondation pour la recherché stratégique of Paris) Defining the Right Mix of Capabilities: The Irreplaceable Role of NATO Nuclear Arrangements, June 2011 Managing Change NATO’s Partnerships and Deterrence in a Globalised World <http://www.nonproliferation.eu/documents/other/natosupremealliedcommandtransformationuniversityofbolognaandistitutoaffariinternazionali4ecb8572a627c.pdf>

What about Russia? One should be skeptical of the possible “exemplary” value of any unilateral gesture that NATO could make in this domain. Calls for a formalization of the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991-1992 (a raft of unilateral initiatives to limit and reduce the US tactical nuclear weapons arsenal decided by US President George Bush sr.), for instance, have always been opposed by Moscow. There is little evidence to suggest that unilateral disarmament has had any positive impact. A unilateral reduction or withdrawal of US nuclear forces in Europe could even be seen as a sign of weakness.

Impact: American interests undermined and millions of people affected by Russia's behavior in response to US weakness. Example: Russian invasion of Georgia

Daniel Benjamin, 2008. (was confirmed by the Senate as the U.S. State Dept's coordinator for counter-terrorism in ‘09; at the time this article was written, he was Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution ) 20 Aug 2008 (brackets in original) [www.brookings.edu/opinions/2008/0820\_russia\_benjamin.aspx](http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2008/0820_russia_benjamin.aspx)

And we are very far from the foreign policy envisioned by Condoleezza Rice in her 2000 Foreign Affairs manifesto for candidate Bush's foreign policy, which promised a new focus on "comprehensive relationships with the big powers, particularly Russia and China, that can and will mold the character of the international political system." As Rice wrote then but quickly seems to have forgotten, "These states are capable of disruption on a grand scale, and their fits of anger or acts of beneficence affect hundreds of millions of people." There is another aspect of the current crisis that is made in America. It was summed up by a European diplomat who told me last week, "The Russians moved because they know you are weak." He hardly needed to explain. With the U.S. military overstretched and publicly complaining about not having enough troops for Afghanistan, Moscow knew it had a propitious moment. Had we not been so bogged down in Iraq and Afghanistan, the White House—which has been watching this crisis build for months—might have left a thousand or so troops in Georgia after our last joint exercise or sent more warships for a visit to the Black Sea. Few would argue that we should get into a shooting match with the Russians over Georgia. But the presence of U.S. forces on the ground, or even the knowledge that there was a significant reserve available in Europe, might have given the Russians pause or at least a healthy fear of miscalculation. As it was, they had a perfect set of circumstances for their strike. Chalk it up as another indirect cost of the U.S. engagement in Iraq—of the fact that for most of Bush's tenure in office, we have had an Iraq policy, not a foreign policy. Dick Cheney often repeats the platitude that "[t]errorist attacks are not caused by the use of strength. They are invited by the perception of weakness." Too bad that Cheney and the administration could only think about terrorists—of whom there were virtually none in Iraq—and not all the other American interests that would be undermined by palpable evidence of our weakness.”

3. Lost Deterrence

Link: Removal of NATO nukes would create a net loss of deterrence

Bruno Tertrais 2011. (Senior Research Fellow at the Fondation pour la recherché stratégique of Paris) Defining the Right Mix of Capabilities: The Irreplaceable Role of NATO Nuclear Arrangements, June 2011 Managing Change NATO’s Partnerships and Deterrence in a Globalised World <http://www.nonproliferation.eu/documents/other/natosupremealliedcommandtransformationuniversityofbolognaandistitutoaffariinternazionali4ecb8572a627c.pdf>

Would alternatives to US gravity bombs be available in the nuclear domain? To a certain extent, yes – but only to a certain extent: there would be a net loss in terms of deterrence. From a technical point of view, there is no question that US or UK strategic forces would be perfectly adequate to threaten nuclear retaliation in case of aggression. However, from a psychological standpoint, an adversary could judge that the use of an intercontinental-range ballistic missile or bomber would be less likely than the use of in-theater forces, especially if the adversary had the capability to strike the United States.

Link: Nuclear weapons are better at deterrence than conventional

Bruno Tertrais 2011. (Senior Research Fellow at the Fondation pour la recherché stratégique of Paris) Defining the Right Mix of Capabilities: The Irreplaceable Role of NATO Nuclear Arrangements, June 2011 Managing Change NATO’s Partnerships and Deterrence in a Globalised World <http://www.nonproliferation.eu/documents/other/natosupremealliedcommandtransformationuniversityofbolognaandistitutoaffariinternazionali4ecb8572a627c.pdf>

For both physical and psychological reasons, conventional weapons do not have the same deterrent power as nuclear ones. Conventional deterrence has a long record of failure – in fact, as long as civilization itself. The threat of conventional bombing is not enough to make an adversary desist when the stakes become extreme or vital, or even when they are more limited: the crises of the past twenty years have shown that it does not always lead the adversary to change its strategic calculus. There is still a large difference today – at least one order of magnitude – between conventional and nuclear yields. For this reason, conventional weapons cost much more for an equivalent effect.

Link: NATO nukes deter by making the risk of attack on NATO far outweigh any possible gain

Franklin Miller, George Robertson & Kori Schake 2010. (Franklin Miller is former senior career policy official in the Pentagon and the White House, George Robertson is former NATO secretary-general and former UK defence secretary, and Kori Schake is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution in the US.) Centre for European Reform, GERMANY OPENS PANDORA’S BOX, 8 Feb 2010 <http://www.cer.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/attachments/pdf/2011/bn_pandora_final_8feb10-245.pdf>

Their presence in Europe, however, affirms the coupling of US nuclear forces – including US strategic forces – to the defence of NATO’s territory. Bluntly put, the nuclear arsenal in Europe serves to put the US homeland at risk to nuclear attack if NATO is forced to resort to using Europe-based nuclear bombs to defend its borders. This in turn signals to any potential aggressor that the risks of an attack against NATO far outweigh any possible gains.

Impact: Reverse Plan Advocacy - Deterrence value of NATO nukes justifies keeping Status Quo

Bruno Tertrais 2011. (Senior Research Fellow at the Fondation pour la recherché stratégique of Paris) Defining the Right Mix of Capabilities: The Irreplaceable Role of NATO Nuclear Arrangements, June 2011 Managing Change NATO’s Partnerships and Deterrence in a Globalised World <http://www.nonproliferation.eu/documents/other/natosupremealliedcommandtransformationuniversityofbolognaandistitutoaffariinternazionali4ecb8572a627c.pdf>

An end to NATO nuclear arrangements would diminish transatlantic burden-sharing and solidarity, and weaken deterrence at a time when threats to NATO’s collective security are increasing. These arrangements should thus be maintained.

Impact: Need NATO nukes to deter threats from Russia and Iran

Bruno Tertrais 2011. (Senior Research Fellow at the Fondation pour la recherché stratégique of Paris) Defining the Right Mix of Capabilities: The Irreplaceable Role of NATO Nuclear Arrangements, June 2011 Managing Change NATO’s Partnerships and Deterrence in a Globalised World <http://www.nonproliferation.eu/documents/other/natosupremealliedcommandtransformationuniversityofbolognaandistitutoaffariinternazionali4ecb8572a627c.pdf>

The current trajectory of Russia’s policies is leading Moscow towards increasing friction with NATO in Europe and with the Western world in general. Likewise, the radicalization of the Iranian leadership and Tehran’s arrival at the nuclear threshold places it on a collision course with Western interests. Of course, the threat is far from being as grave and immediate as it was during the Cold War. But it is a credible hypothesis that by 2015 NATO, for the first time in its history, will face two revisionist nuclear-armed countries along its borders. This is not the right time to let down the nuclear guard.

4. Lose focus on the real problem

Link: NATO tactical nuclear weapons focus distracts us from the real issue: World stability with expanding club of nuclear nations

Impact: Net benefits: Nuclear disarmament would produce at best marginal benefits, and more often it's harmful

Sergei Karaganov 2010. Sergei Karaganov (Dean of the School of World Economics and Foreign Affairs at Moscow State University - Higher School of Economics) 29 Apr 2010 The Dangers of Nuclear Disarmament <http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/karaganov14/English>

Similarly, if the US withdraws its largely nominal tactical nuclear weapons from Europe, US-Europe strategic ties would weaken. Many Europeans, above all in the new NATO member-states, would then demand more protection from the mythical Russian Leviathan. The world community seems to be losing its strategic bearings. Instead of focusing on the real problem, namely the increasingly unstable international order, it is trying to apply Cold War-era concepts of disarmament. At best, these are marginally useful; more often, they are harmful in today’s circumstances. What is most needed nowadays is clear thinking about how to live with an expanding club of nuclear states while keeping the world relatively stable. To this end, the two great nuclear powers need a coordinated deterrence policy towards new nuclear states. Simultaneously, they should offer guarantees to non-nuclear states that might feel insecure.

Impact: Proliferation = increased risk of nuclear war

GEORGE P. SHULTZ, WILLIAM J. PERRY, HENRY A. KISSINGER AND SAM NUNN 2011 (Mr. Shultz was secretary of state from 1982 to 1989. Mr. Perry was secretary of defense from 1994 to 1997. Mr. Kissinger was secretary of state from 1973 to 1977. Mr. Nunn is former chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee.) March 7, 2011 “Deterrence in the Age of Nuclear Proliferation” THE WALL STREET JOURNAL <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703300904576178760530169414.html>

Today, the Cold War is almost 20 years behind us, but many leaders and publics cannot conceive of deterrence without a strategy of mutual assured destruction. We have written previously that reliance on this strategy is becoming increasingly hazardous. With the spread of nuclear weapons, technology, materials and know-how, there is an increasing risk that nuclear weapons will be used. It is not possible to replicate the high-risk stability that prevailed between the two nuclear superpowers during the Cold War in such an environment. The growing number of nations with nuclear arms and differing motives, aims and ambitions poses very high and unpredictable risks and increased instability.

5. Broken Umbrella Leading to Russian Coercion

Link: We need as many NATO members as possible hosting nuclear weapons. If not, it becomes difficult to convince NATO states to provide nuclear umbrella over non-nuclear partners

**Analysis: The “nuclear umbrella” means that nuclear weapon nations (US, Britain France) guarantee non-nuclear countries (all the other NATO members) that if they get attacked by nuclear weapons, the nuclear countries will use our nukes to retaliate. It discourages enemies from attacking and it reassures our allies that they don’t need to build nuclear weapons of their own.**

Malcolm Chalmers 2010. Malcolm Chalmers (Professorial Fellow in British Security Policy at the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies; Professor of Defence and Foreign Policy in the Department of War Studies, Kings College, London) March 2010 NATO's Tactical Nuclear Dilemma <http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/NATOs_Nuclear_Dilemma.pdf> (brackets added; parentheses in original)

Yet, as the first of these chapters makes clear, some other key NATO member states, together with influential policy experts, are far from convinced of the wisdom of unilaterally ‘going to zero’ in NATO DCA [dual-capable aircraft; nuclear + non-nuclear] deployments. Since their inception in the 1960s, dual-key nuclear deployments have played a critical role in symbolising the sharing of nuclear burdens between nuclear and non-nuclear member states. As long as extended nuclear deterrence plays a central role in NATO doctrine, they argue, it is important to ensure that as many member states as possible are involved in the maintenance of the forces that symbolise that policy, not least because this act ensures that non-nuclear states then have to ‘dip their hands in the blood’ of preparing to use these weapons. Were non-nuclear states no longer to have a role in preparing for nuclear use, they argue, it might be increasingly difficult to convince nuclear-armed alliance members (the US, UK and potentially France) to risk the lives of their own citizens to extend an ‘umbrella’ over their nonnuclear partners.

Link: US nuclear capabilities are essential to prevent nuclear coercion by Moscow

Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States 2009. (former Defense Secretaries William Perry (chairman) and James Schlensinger (vice-chairman); bipartisan committee selected by Congress) presented to Congress on 6 May 2009 <http://www.usip.org/files/America's_Strategic_Posture_Auth_Ed.pdf>

Some U.S. allies believe that extended deterrence requires little more than stability in the central balances of nuclear power among the major powers. But other allies believe that their needs can only be met with very specific U.S. nuclear capabilities. This point was brought home vividly in our work as a Commission. Some allies located near Russia believe that U.S. non-strategic forces in Europe are essential to prevent nuclear coercion by Moscow and indeed that modernized U.S./NATO forces are essential for restoring a sense of balance in the face of Russia’s nuclear renewal. One particularly important ally has argued to the Commission privately that the credibility of the U.S. extended deterrent depends on its specific capabilities to hold a wide variety of targets at risk, and to deploy forces in a way that is either visible or stealthy, as circumstances may demand.

Link: Russia is increasing its non-strategic nuclear forces

Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States 2009. (former Defense Secretaries William Perry (chairman) and James Schlensinger (vice-chairman); bipartisan committee selected by Congress) presented to Congress on 6 May 2009 <http://www.usip.org/files/America's_Strategic_Posture_Auth_Ed.pdf>

As part of its effort to compensate for weaknesses in its conventional forces, Russia’s military leaders are putting more emphasis on non-strategic nuclear forces (NSNF, particularly weapons intended for tactical use on the battlefield). Russia no longer sees itself as capable of defending its vast territory and nearby interests with conventional forces.

Link: US needs to hedge against Russia's nuclear threats to coerce its neighbors

Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States 2009. (former Defense Secretaries William Perry (chairman) and James Schlensinger (vice-chairman); bipartisan committee selected by Congress) presented to Congress on 6 May 2009 <http://www.usip.org/files/America's_Strategic_Posture_Auth_Ed.pdf>

The risk of direct military confrontation between the United States and Russia is much lower than during the Cold War. But the risk of nuclear coercion is another matter. After all, Russia has used nuclear threats to attempt to coerce some of its neighbors, including U.S. allies, and this is a problem for which U.S. nuclear strategy and capabilities remain relevant. It is also conceivable that these assessments might change for the worse at some future time, and the United States needs to hedge against that possibility.

Link: Russia has opened up new possibilities of using or threatening nuclear weapons in regional conflicts

*Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States 2009. (former Defense Secretaries William Perry (chairman) and James Schlensinger (vice-chairman); bipartisan committee selected by Congress) presented to Congress on 6 May 2009 (brackets added; parentheses in original)* [*http://www.usip.org/files/America's\_Strategic\_Posture\_Auth\_Ed.pdf*](http://www.usip.org/files/America's_Strategic_Posture_Auth_Ed.pdf)

As the Cold War ended, and as noted above, these NSNF [non-strategic nuclear forces] were reduced under the auspices of the PNIs [presidential nuclear initiatives] and also the Treaty on Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces of 1987. Nonetheless, Russia reportedly retains a very large number of such weapons. Senior Russian experts have reported that Russia has 3,800 operational tactical nuclear warheads with a large additional number in reserve. Some Russian military experts have written about use of very low yield nuclear “scalpels” to defeat NATO forces. The combination of new warhead designs, the estimated production capability for new nuclear warheads, and precision delivery systems such as the Iskander short-range tactical ballistic missile (known as the SS-26 in the West), open up new possibilities for Russian efforts to threaten to use nuclear weapons to influence regional conflicts.

Brink: Russia's coercion of its neighbors is a looming flash point

Denis Corboy, William Courtney and Kenneth Yalowitz 2009. (Corboy - director of the Caucasus Policy Institute at King's College London and a former European Commission ambassador to Georgia. Courtney - was U.S. ambassador to Kazakhstan and Georgia. Yalowitz - was U.S. ambassador to Belarus and Georgia) 6 Jan 2009 NEW YORK TIMES, Russia's next flash point, <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/06/opinion/06iht-edcourtney.1.19125285.html>

Russia's coercion of its neighbors is a looming flash point for Europe and the United States, and President-elect Barack Obama. Autocratic Russia is bent on exploiting weak neighbors and reversing perceived humiliations since the breakup of the Soviet Union.

Impact: Threatens important US & European interests; tens of billions of dollars at stake

*Denis Corboy, William Courtney and Kenneth Yalowitz, January 2009. (Corboy -director of the Caucasus Policy Institute at King's College London and a former European Commission ambassador to Georgia. Courtney - was U.S. ambassador to Kazakhstan and Georgia. Yalowitz - was U.S. ambassador to Belarus and Georgia) 6 Jan 2009 NEW YORK TIMES, Russia's next flash point,* [*http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/06/opinion/06iht-edcourtney.1.19125285.html*](http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/06/opinion/06iht-edcourtney.1.19125285.html)

Russian use of force could threaten important U.S. and European interests. Gaining control over Caspian energy would jeopardize tens of billions of dollars of Western investment and heighten Europe's energy dependence on Russia. U.S. and European forces in Afghanistan will increasingly depend on ground-based logistics through Central Asia and the South Caucasus.

6. Loss of NATO solidarity

Link: Removal of NATO nukes would lead to corrosive debate and division within NATO

Franklin Miller, George Robertson & Kori Schake 2010. (Franklin Miller is former senior career policy official in the Pentagon and the White House, George Robertson is former NATO secretary-general and former UK defence secretary, and Kori Schake is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution in the US.) Centre for European Reform, GERMANY OPENS PANDORA’S BOX, 8 Feb 2010 <http://www.cer.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/attachments/pdf/2011/bn_pandora_final_8feb10-245.pdf>

Poland and the Baltic states in particular are likely to argue with merit that a withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Europe would constitute a material change to those commitments, and to NATO’s mutual defence guarantee, ‘Article V’, as they understood it. They will be particularly worried that the security of the United States is being decoupled from the security of Europe – the new NATO countries still trust the US more than their west European counterparts. The new allies will probably compensate by demanding from NATO a series of war plans and exercises to determine how to adjust operationally to the changes in nuclear posture. This would spark a corrosive internal debate within NATO. Russia can be relied upon to claim that any steps to revise NATO defence planning or exercises are provocative (despite the fact that it still possesses 5,400 tactical nuclear weapons. It has also recently completed military exercises in Kaliningrad involving 13,000 Russian and Belarusian troops, which featured a notional nuclear attack on Poland). While without foundation, Moscow’s protests would divide the allies, who, even after the Russian exercise, have been unable to agree that full planning should be undertaken for defence of the countries bordering on Russia (though limited planning has taken place, and the United States has agreed to conduct annual military exercises in the Baltic states beginning in the autumn of 2010).

Link: Affirmative doesn't consult with NATO allies, it's unilateral US action

Link: NATO solidarity rests on the principle of sharing the defense burden, including nuclear weapons

Franklin Miller, George Robertson & Kori Schake 2010. (Franklin Miller is former senior career policy official in the Pentagon and the White House, George Robertson is former NATO secretary-general and former UK defence secretary, and Kori Schake is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution in the US.) Centre for European Reform, GERMANY OPENS PANDORA’S BOX, 8 Feb 2010 (brackets in original) <http://www.cer.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/attachments/pdf/2011/bn_pandora_final_8feb10-245.pdf>

As NATO’s 1999 strategic concept states, the alliance believes that “the presence of US nuclear forces based in Europe and committed to NATO provides an essential political and military link between the European and North American members of the alliance, demonstrates alliance solidarity [and] the common commitment of its member countries to maintaining their security.” This formula has worked well over the decades, even as the threats facing NATO have changed, as has the alliance’s nuclear posture. Solidarity among NATO countries rests on the principle that all allies share the burden of defending NATO, and that defence still requires nuclear weapons.

Link: Have to find consensus about nuclear weapons in NATO, else it could become a source of contention

Malcolm Chalmers & Simon Lunn 2010. (Chalmers - Professorial Fellow in British Security Policy at the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies; Professor of Defence and Foreign Policy in the Department of War Studies, Kings College, London. Lunn - former Secretary General of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly; directed the Assembly’s outreach program for the parliaments of Central and Eastern Europe) March 2010 NATO's Tactical Nuclear Dilemma <http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/NATOs_Nuclear_Dilemma.pdf>

It is in the collective interest of all NATO member states that this issue is managed sensitively. There is a danger that it could become a source of contention between members, in the process sapping political energy from the need for progress on more central issues. If a new consensus is to be reached, it will be important to look for a way forward that meets both deterrence and disarmament concerns, ensuring that all member states have gained something in the process. Former NATO Secretary General George Robertson, together with former US administration officials Franklin Miller and Kori Schake, recently published a strong criticism of Germany’s decision to call for the abolition of nuclear weapons on its soil. Instead, they called for NATO to ‘collectively negotiate with Moscow asymmetric but multilateral reductions to Russian and allied tactical nuclear arsenals’.

Link: Without solidarity NATO will not survive

Prof. Julian Lindley-French and Prof. Yves Boyer in April 2010. Julian Lindley-French (Eisenhower Professor of Defence Strategy at the Netherlands Defence Academy and Associate Fellow, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London) Yves Boyer (Professor of Geopolitics at EcolePolytechnique and Deputy Director of Fondation pour la RechercheStratégique, Paris) writing for Strategic Advisors Group, Co-Chairs: Senator Chuck Hagel and Tom Enders; Chairman, Atlantic Council International Advisory Board: General Brent Scowcroft, STRATCON 2010:An Alliance for a Global Century, Apr 2010 [http://www.frstrategie.org/barreFRS/publications/autres/Natostrategicconcept.pdf](http://www.google.com/url?q=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.frstrategie.org%2FbarreFRS%2Fpublications%2Fautres%2FNatostrategicconcept.pdf&sa=D&sntz=1&usg=AFQjCNGhIj9AbliTi50LYFMG5kxxWEbJig" \t "_blank)

Solidarity – The True Test. The process of preparing a new Strategic Concept must restore a sense of trust and solidarity among allies. A true test of the Strategic Concept will be whether or not it offers a frank assessment of security, the place of the Alliance in it and makes a convincing case for the continued relevance of NATO. Alliances are built on solidarity and today NATO’s solidarity is under challenge, often more from rhetorical than actual challenges. Strategic credibility and strategic reassurance are the twin pillars of Strategic Concept 2010. However, these pillars must themselves be established on credible political will. Alliance solidarity must be strong enough to survive contact with danger. Today too many allies lack a shared conviction of the Alliance’s core commitments and their own responsibilities, and without it no alliance (nor indeed Union) can survive over time.

Impact: WMD’s and Terrorism. Europe without NATO would be more vulnerable to Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and terrorism

Dr. Hans Binnendijk & Dr. Richard Kugler in 2003. (Binnendijk - PhD in international relations; Vice President for Research at National Defense University, Director and Roosevelt Chair, Center for Technology and National Security Policy . Kugler - PhD, Distinguished Research Professor in the Center for Technology and National Security Policy at the National Defense University ) Nov 2003, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, "Dual-Track Transformation for the Atlantic Alliance," DEFENSE HORIZONS, [http://www.gees.org/files/publications/14032010105406\_OTAN%28I%29.pdf](http://www.google.com/url?q=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.gees.org%2Ffiles%2Fpublications%2F14032010105406_OTAN%2528I%2529.pdf&sa=D&sntz=1&usg=AFQjCNEbpmTHmHItk9QbkqPBQecH_N4ghA" \t "_blank) (WMD = weapons of mass destruction)

Even if bigger budgets were forthcoming, European militaries no longer would enjoy U.S. help in developing new-era doctrines, structures, and technologies. In the military transformation arena, they would be left on the outside looking in. Without U.S. contributions, they could be hard-pressed to muster the wherewithal to deploy missile defenses to shield Europe from WMD attacks. Developing serious forces for power-projection outside Europe also would be difficult, without American help in such critical areas as C4ISR, strategic lift, and logistic support. Overall, the collapse of NATO could leave Europe more vulnerable to threats across the spectrum from terrorism to WMD proliferation and less able to exert influence in the regions that produce these threats.

Impact: We need NATO for a more peaceful world

Prof. Alfred van Staden January 2007. (Director, Netherlands Institute of International Relations) , Apr 2005, "International Relations" [http://www.wordtrade.com/society/politics/internationalrelations.htm](http://www.google.com/url?q=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.wordtrade.com%2Fsociety%2Fpolitics%2Finternationalrelations.htm&sa=D&sntz=1&usg=AFQjCNHhexpHfBmS9Ifk18MA-xZmRDU10g" \t "_blank)

Although the Atlantic Alliance cannot be taken as a substitute for the UN when it comes to the collective legitimization of force, it is definitely one of the main pillars of the international order. Consequently, the survival of NATO should be of immediate concern to all those who care about a more peaceful world.

ALTERNATE PHILOSOPHY / MINOR REPAIR / COUNTERPLAN LINKS & IDEAS

#1: Consult with Allies before we do anything

NATO members do not have a common understanding about risks and threats

Oliver Schmidt, April 2010. (German Council on Foreign Relations; Germany's oldest non-partisan, non-governmental think tank) 27 Apr 2010 The Utility of U.S. Tactical Nuclear Weapons in NATO: A European Perspective <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=40680>

What these three positions reveal is that NATO does not have a common understanding of risks and threats. While the countries of central and Eastern Europe still fear the perceived threat of Russia, the countries of Western and Southern Europe are more focused on new security challenges stemming mainly from non-state actors. The result of this security divide is the current controversy over the nearly 200 remaining U.S. tactical nuclear weapons stationed in Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey, and Germany. Eastern European countries like Poland view these weapons as a sign that the United States is taking the mutual defense clause enshrined in Article 5 of NATO's charter seriously. As a U.S. ally, and perhaps given Iran's nuclear ambitions, Turkey is also very cautious about the possible withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons from its soil. More fundamental is the concern in Europe over the obvious imbalance between NATO's 200 tactical nuclear weapons and Russia’s estimated 3,000 non-strategic weapons.

US should consult with allies about requirements for deterrence and assurance

Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States 2009. Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States (former Defense Secretaries William Perry (chairman) and James Schlensinger (vice-chairman); bipartisan committee selected by Congress) presented to Congress on 6 May 2009 <http://www.usip.org/files/America's_Strategic_Posture_Auth_Ed.pdf>

The United States should adapt its strategic posture to the evolving requirements of deterrence, extended deterrence, and assurance. As part of an effort to understand assurance requirements, steps to increase allied consultations should be expanded.

Advocacy: US nuclear forces should not be changed without first consulting with allies

Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States 2009. Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States (former Defense Secretaries William Perry (chairman) and James Schlensinger (vice-chairman); bipartisan committee selected by Congress) presented to Congress on 6 May 2009 <http://www.usip.org/files/America's_Strategic_Posture_Auth_Ed.pdf>

Clearly, the U.S. nuclear force posture should not be re-designed without substantive and high-level consultations with U.S. allies in both Europe and Asia and we cannot prejudge the conclusions of such consultations here. The Commission’s own consultations on this topic have brought home to us that U.S. allies and friends in Europe and Asia are not all of a single mind concerning the requirements for extended deterrence and assurance.

#2: Invite Russia to talks about NATO nukes

Russia has far more nukes - East European allies want mutual reductions to be negotiated with Russia, not unilateral withdrawal of nukes

Chalmers & Lunn in March 2010. (Chalmers - professorial Fellow in British Security Policy at the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies; Professor of Defence and Foreign Policy in the Department of War Studies, Kings College, London. Lunn - Former Secretary General of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly; initiated and directed the Assembly’s outreach program for the parliaments of Central and Eastern Europe) March 2010 NATO's Tactical Nuclear Dilemma <http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/NATOs_Nuclear_Dilemma.pdf> (parentheses in original)

At a time when Russia retains much larger arsenals of sub-strategic nuclear weapons, however, the Baltic states worry that unilateral withdrawal of all equivalent NATO weapons could be seen as diluting US guarantees of their security. The foreign ministers of Sweden and Poland have added to calls for Russian sub-strategic weapons to be included in the discussion, calling for sharp mutual reductions as part of US/Russian arms control talks, starting with Russian weapons deployed close to European Union member states (in the Kola peninsula and Kaliningrad).