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NEGATIVE BRIEF: Qualifying Industrial Zones (QIZ) - bad

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**This brief argues against plans that establish new Qualifying Industrial Zones in the Mid East. QIZs are zones designated by the US in a foreign country where goods produced in that zone, if they contain a certain percentage of raw materials or content made in Israel, can then be exported to the United States free of import tariffs. QIZs were designed to promote better Arab/Israel relations through increased trade between Arab countries and Israel by giving them an incentive of eliminated tariffs when they sell the resulting product in the US.**

INHERENCY

US has QIZs with Egypt, Israel and Jordan already

Maria Donner Abreu 2013. (Economic Research & Statistics Division of the World Trade Organization) PREFERENTIAL RULES OF ORIGIN IN REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS, March 2013 <http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/reser_e/ersd201305_e.pdf>

QIZs were established autonomously by the United States in 1996; imports of products manufactured in these zones - which encompass portions of the territory of Israel and Jordan, and Israel and Egypt - benefit from duty-free entry to the United States if they meet the relevant rules of origin. QIZs were presented as an instrument to support the Middle East peace process, having the dual aim of developing business co-operation between Israel and Jordan and Israel and Egypt, and also of diversifying the economies of Jordan and Egypt.

SOLVENCY

Israeli agreement is required

**Israeli agreement is part of the QIZ process, but Affirmative plan cannot force Israel to accept the changes and they read no evidence that the government of Israel agrees with their plan**

Israel Ports Development & Assets Company 2012. “U.S. and Israel approved the expansion of Qualified Industrial Zones” 4 Apr 2012 <http://eng.israports.co.il/IsraelPortsCompany/newscompany/press%20release/2009/Pages/USandIsraelapprovedtheexpansionofQualifiedIndustrialZones.aspx>

According to Mahmoud Eissa, Egyptian Industry and Foreign Trade Minister, U.S. and Israel approved the expansion of QIZ  
Mahmoud Eissa Egyptian Industry and Foreign Trade Minister was quoted last week that Egypt received U.S. and Israeli approval to expand its Qualified Industrial Zones into the southern part of the country.  Qualifying Industrial Zones (QIZ) are designated geographic areas, within Egypt, that enjoy a duty free status with the United States. Companies located within such zones are granted duty free access to the US markets, provided that they satisfy the agreed upon Israeli component, as per the pre-defined rules of origin. Minister Eissa said in an interview in Cairo that a U.S. trade delegation is slated to visit the country in the first half of April to discuss the expansion of the areas.

QIZ requires approval from both Israel and the United States for an Arab country to do it

Prof. Pete Moore 2005. (associate professor of political science at Case Western Reserve Univ) QIZs, FTAs, USAID, and the MEFTA, MIDDLE EAST REPORT, Spring 2005 <http://www.merip.org/mer/mer234/qizs-ftas-usaid-mefta>

Gaining permission to open a QIZ requires permission from several levels of the Jordanian government, as well as permission from Tel Aviv and Washington. Not surprisingly, business elites close to the monarchy and government officials have opened the first zones and have been the most successful.

“QIZ creates jobs” – Response: Not really. They import low-skill workers from other countries to work in QIZs.

Prof. Ahmed Farouk Ghoneim & Prof. Taleb Awad 2009. (Ghoneim - Associate Professor of Economics, Faculty of Economics and Political Science, Cairo University. Awad - Professor of Economics, Department of Business Economics, Faculty of Business, University of Jordan ) Impact of Qualifying Industrial Zones on Egypt and Jordan: A Critical Analysis (ethical disclosure on the date: The article is undated but refers to events that happened in 2009, so we know it was written no earlier than 2009; it refers to 2011 as being in the future.) <http://vi.unctad.org/digital-library/?task=dl_doc&doc_name=impactqualifying-industrial>

Job creation was a central objective of the QIZs agreement. However, since most of QIZs activities are concentrated in apparel and garment products, the quality of employment in QIZs projects are expected to be mainly of a low skill nature. Table (2) shows the current distribution of QIZ's employment by nationality and industrial zones. QIZs currently employ close to 40,000 workers, only about one quarter of them are Jordanian. The rest of them are cheap labour imported from different countries, mainly from East Asian countries. The major employer of Jordanian workers is Al-Hasan Industrial Estate in a low skill apparel and garment activities. The highest percentage of foreign workers (87 per cent) is employed in Ad-Dulayl Industrial Park, followed by Al-Tajamouat Industrial City (80 per cent).

Companies don’t sign up. Example: Egypt. Food companies didn’t want QIZs – tiny benefits and too much complexity

Prof. Ahmed Farouk Ghoneim & Prof. Taleb Awad 2009. (Ghoneim - Assoc Professor of Economics, Faculty of Economics and Political Science, Cairo Univ. Awad - Professor of Economics, Dept of Business Economics, Faculty of Business, Univ of Jordan ) Impact of Qualifying Industrial Zones on Egypt and Jordan: A Critical Analysis (ethical disclosure on the date: The article is undated but refers to events that happened in 2009) <http://vi.unctad.org/digital-library/?task=dl_doc&doc_name=impactqualifying-industrial>

In this section, we aim at evaluating QIZ performance in the Egyptian case based on the existing limited literature, and the analysis of available data and information. Sallam (2008) identified that processed food exporters have very limited interest in using QIZ as a vehicle to enhance their exports to the US. Of the total of 246 processed food factories in Egypt, 127 factories are located in QIZ designated areas. However, only 16 factories have registered themselves in QIZ in 2007, representing 2 per cent of total processed food factories. Sallam (2008) identified a number of reasons for the low propensity of Egyptian processed food exporters to use QIZ. Among the reasons behind this reluctance are: the small amount of potential gains from using QIZ which is mainly a result of the relatively low Most Favoured Nation (MFN) tariffs on a large number of processed food products in the US market (e.g. zero tariff rate on herbs); exaggerated prices for Israeli inputs, which on average are 20 to 30 per cent higher than Egyptian inputs; limited items that can be used from Israel in this sector, which do not exceed 4 or 5 percent, while the rules of origin require a 10.5 percent minimum; and the complex and expensive procedures of allocating an importer in the US, including the sending of samples (where long travel distance accompanied by specific requirements for low temperature make it extremely costly and difficult to meet).

Jordan experience: QIZ Business benefits are limited and short-term

Joseph P. Gaffney 2005. (master’s degree candidate at Univ of Pennsylvania) Jordan’s Qualified Industrial Zones: A Qualified Success? <http://lauder.wharton.upenn.edu/pages/pdf/student_thesis/Gaffney_Thesis.pdf>

The foreign direct investment (FDI) into the QIZs has not been of the quality anticipated at the start of the zones. The Jordanian government took advantage of its ability to sell Jordan as a tariff- and quota-free zone. The resulting investors are in an industry that even government officials characterize as footloose. These companies have little loyalty to a country or region. Usually these companies in the QIZs are subsidiaries of larger foreign companies. The goal of this investment is to make a short-term profit. This short-term goal has meant even weaker links to the Jordanian economy. There is little urgency to localize the workforce, and add-on investments follow the same short-term goals. Some companies are willing to pull out at short notice due to negative results or less expensive opportunities elsewhere. Finally, there is little knowledge transfer from these foreign subsidiaries, since all of the high value-added roles like design, marketing, business development are handled by the mother company. Local investment in the QIZs is limited to just a few companies, and even companies from Arab countries have a small footprint, despite a good business environment and the similarities in culture.

QIZs don’t promote freedom or social/economic reform – in fact, they concentrate political power

Prof. Pete Moore 2005. (associate professor of political science at Case Western Reserve Univ) QIZs, FTAs, USAID, and the MEFTA, MIDDLE EAST REPORT, Spring 2005 <http://www.merip.org/mer/mer234/qizs-ftas-usaid-mefta>

Bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs), Qualifying Industrial Zones (QIZs) and country-specific assistance programs managed by the US Agency for International Development (USAID) are all pieces of the puzzle comprising the Middle East Free Trade Area (MEFTA) that the administration seeks. The free trade agreement signed with Jordan in 2000 is regarded in Washington as a cornerstone of MEFTA’s eventual edifice. These mechanisms, while new to US policy in the Middle East, were well-worn instruments of US policy toward the developing world during the Cold War. Then, as now, the bet was that liberalized trade and assistance would foster political change. Economic institutions, in other words, are deployed as political tools. These artifacts of Cold War logic, however, are ill-suited to a supporting role in Bush’s “forward march of freedom” drama in the Arab world. It is the political and social reality of Arab countries that will shape the outcome of these experiments. US trade and development policy has yielded a decidedly mixed bag of economic results in the Arab world. The political effects are clearer -- and, if Jordan is any guide, the main effect has been to further concentrate political power.

Claims of success in Jordan are exaggerated. QIZ ‘success’ numbers may have been fudged

Prof. Pete Moore 2005. (associate professor of political science at Case Western Reserve Univ) QIZs, FTAs, USAID, and the MEFTA, MIDDLE EAST REPORT, Spring 2005 <http://www.merip.org/mer/mer234/qizs-ftas-usaid-mefta>

The advocacy position, in short, reduces to an argument that the glass is half full -- Jordan has more jobs and exports more to the US market. Critics respond with different numbers and a different glass. There is much to question in the rosy statistics cited by the government, they say. Jordan’s economic ministries are no strangers to the political necessity of providing encouraging numbers to the International Monetary Fund and World Bank. How about Jordan’s clearly impressive GDP growth figures, then? Growth is not necessarily development and the reasons for the growth are hardly attributable to trade and economic reform. Jordan, and Amman specifically, have clearly benefited from capital flight from the West Bank as well as Iraq. For older businessmen, the scene recalls the 1970s, when the country underwent a similar artificial boom fueled by the Lebanese civil war and oil money from the Gulf, eventually leading to crisis in the 1980s. Like then, today much of the growth is generated by short-term investments in real estate and services located in West Amman and purchases from the fast-bulging pockets of the capital’s upper class. For the poor and working class located in East Amman, prices have gone up while incomes have stagnated. Moreover, Jordan has become one of the world’s most dependent nations on foreign aid. The draft budget for 2005 estimates that foreign aid and oil grants from the Gulf states will equal 15 percent of the GDP, an astounding figure for a country that is suppose to be a regional example of productive development. Critics point out that the numbers are often used as a bait and switch, depending on the political necessities.

QIZs didn’t benefit Jordanian women. They don’t stay long on the job and don’t learn new skills

Prof. Pete Moore 2005. (associate professor of political science at Case Western Reserve Univ) QIZs, FTAs, USAID, and the MEFTA, MIDDLE EAST REPORT, Spring 2005 <http://www.merip.org/mer/mer234/qizs-ftas-usaid-mefta>

At a July 2004 conference on trade reform hosted by the Jordan Center for Public Policy Research and Dialogue, there were no less than three different government estimates of QIZ employment. Assuming 30,000 QIZ jobs, the number of foreign workers still exceeds 40 percent in most analyses. The usual excuse is high turnover among Jordanian workers versus the reliability and skill of South Asian workers. Thus, Jordanian women may be working in the QIZs, but they are not staying long and very rarely learning new skills on the job.

QIZ doesn’t improve Arab-Israeli international relations

Joseph P. Gaffney 2005. (master’s degree candidate at Univ of Pennsylvania) Jordan’s Qualified Industrial Zones: A Qualified Success? <http://lauder.wharton.upenn.edu/pages/pdf/student_thesis/Gaffney_Thesis.pdf>

Almost 10 years after the original QIZ agreement was signed, the success of the QIZs are still in contention. Politically, the situation between Jordan and Israel is poor, especially as the Al-Aqsa intifadah continues and the security wall is built. It is my view that the QIZs were formed in a particular moment when person-to-person contact was seen as the most direct way to solidify peace in the Middle East. In hindsight, it was not possible for the QIZs, by themselves, to countervail the deteriorating situation between Palestinians and Israelis. Moreover, people-to-people conflict does not change mindsets; shared economic interests may make for temporary alliances, but larger events overtake these alliances. Based on my research, the working relationship between Israel and Jordan is still just that, about working, contracts and supplies, not larger issues of justice or peace.

QIZs don’t help normalize Arab relations with Israel

Joseph P. Gaffney 2005. (master’s degree candidate at Univ of Pennsylvania) Jordan’s Qualified Industrial Zones: A Qualified Success? <http://lauder.wharton.upenn.edu/pages/pdf/student_thesis/Gaffney_Thesis.pdf>

Businessmen in Jordan, as a general rule, would rather not work with Israelis, and those of Palestinian decent (the majority of people in Jordan) find it even more difficult. Although the business lobbies in Jordan are ineffective, the fact that a business organization opposing an agreement with such economic benefits suggests that the political will for peace with Israel was lacking. Since that time, the QIZs have continued to grow, but the opposition to normalization with Israel has remained.

Palestinian free trade zones have already been tried and failed

*Sam Bahour 2010 (Palestinian business management consultant living in Ramallah, West Bank, Palestinian territory) 19 Nov 2010* West Bank ‘industrial zones’ <http://jfjfp.com/?p=19122>

When a project mixes the feel-good words of jobs, economic development and Israeli-Palestinian cooperation, how can anyone complain? These things are some of what the international community has been promising to deliver through the construction of industrial free trade zones in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. The free trade zone model has been promoted locally and globally by powerful third parties like the United States, France, Germany, Turkey and Japan for two decades, but none has much to show for the enormous efforts and amounts of money spent to bring these zones to life.

Political disruptions block Palestinian free trade/industrial zones from working successfully

*Sam Bahour 2010 (Palestinian business management consultant living in Ramallah, West Bank, Palestinian territory) 19 Nov 2010* West Bank ‘industrial zones’ <http://jfjfp.com/?p=19122>

The longest-operating border zone is the Erez Industrial Zone located at the northern tip of the Gaza Strip. It was estimated by the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs to employ 20,000 Palestinians, but it never came close to employing a quarter of that number and in 2004, the Israeli minister of defense made a decision to withdraw Israeli firms located in the zone for security reasons. The area became a no-man’s land. The Jerusalem Post reported on January 2, 2006 that Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül visited Israel to sign agreements with Israel and the Palestinian Authority (PA) governing Turkey’s role in reviving the Erez industrial area. One Israeli official described the project as “the baby” of Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoan. But following Hamas’ takeover of Gaza in 2007, Turkey froze the project and the zone remains empty.

Palestinian QIZs will fail to promote economic development. Too many other blocking factors, and they would displace existing businesses

*Sam Bahour 2010 (Palestinian business management consultant living in Ramallah, West Bank, Palestinian territory) 19 Nov 2010* West Bank ‘industrial zones’ <http://jfjfp.com/?p=19122>

The World Bank acknowledges as much when it states repeatedly in its reports that, even while proclaiming 8 percent economic growth, the “critical private sector investment needed to drive sustainable growth remains hampered by restrictions on movement of people and goods.” It is clear that economic growth is not necessarily equivalent to economic development, especially in a politically charged, donor-driven environment like the Occupied Territories under the quasi-rule of the PA. The privileged status of the zones also raises ethical concerns. While Israeli restrictions will be eased in order to ensure smooth functioning for foreign investors, indigenous industries will continue to face the same hurdles that have hindered Palestinian industry for decades. Thus, existing businesses will be placed at a comparative disadvantage.

Palestinian zones would not be effective and would depend on Israeli government acceptance [No AFF evidence says Israel will agree]

*Sam Bahour 2010 (Palestinian business management consultant living in Ramallah, West Bank, Palestinian territory) 19 Nov 2010* West Bank ‘industrial zones’ <http://jfjfp.com/?p=19122>

Donor funds and Palestinian efforts would be better placed if such investments targeted Palestine’s natural economic comparative advantages, for example, tourism and agriculture, without trying to confine their activities to closed zones that will, over time, empty large tracts of land of their productive capacity, not to mention create structural dependency on Israeli good will to allow these closed zones to function properly.

Palestinian zones can never work as long as Israeli occupation continues

*Sam Bahour 2010 (Palestinian business management consultant living in Ramallah, West Bank, Palestinian territory) 19 Nov 2010* West Bank ‘industrial zones’ <http://jfjfp.com/?p=19122>

While they might benefit a certain elite, the planned economic zones cannot benefit Palestinian strategic interests. The notion that political differences can be solved through job creation is fundamentally flawed and will not change the reality: 60 percent of Palestinians are internally displaced or dwell in refugee camps just hours from their homes and properties; 1.5 million Palestinians in Gaza survive under siege conditions; hundreds of thousands have been illegally detained by Israel; and the economy is micro-managed by a foreign military. The development projects proposed by the international community only normalize the illegal occupation, by working in partnership with Israel to fine-tune its mechanisms of control.

DISADVANTAGES

1. Sweat shops and modern day slavery.

Link: QIZs avoid labor law enforcement

Maria Donner Abreu 2013. (Economic Research & Statistics Division of the World Trade Organization) PREFERENTIAL RULES OF ORIGIN IN REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS, March 2013 <http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/reser_e/ersd201305_e.pdf>

Various reports from US agencies refer, however, to the concentration in the QIZ of textile and apparel production, the more modest results on trade between Jordan and Israel as well as the mixed results regarding the social impact of the QIZ. In particular, they point out that more than half of the QIZ workers are from southern Asia, and of various shortfalls regarding enforcement of labor laws within the QIZ.

Impact: QIZ workers treated like slaves

Jeremy Sharp 2009. (specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs with Congressional Research Service) 24 July 2009 “Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations” <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/128834.pdf>

Currently there are 13 QIZs in Jordan employing approximately 43,000 people (working 8 hour days/6 days a week), 74% of whom are foreign workers from South East Asian nations like Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka. In general, foreign laborers are generally viewed as more skilled and productive than local Jordanians. In addition, it is difficult for employers to recruit local Jordanians since workers typically live on site, and many are hesitant to separate from their families, though in some areas local Jordanians are provided with free transportation to the QIZs. According to one Jordanian labor leader, foreign workers are attractive to employers because “They are like slaves. They work them day and night.” Labor rights activists also have complained that Jordanian workers in the QIZs are excluded from a new minimum wage law.

Impact: 28% of Jordan QIZs were running sweatshops and workers’ rights were violated. The Jordanian government tried to fix it, but it’s not enough to solve

Jeremy Sharp 2009. (specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs with Congressional Research Service) 24 July 2009 “Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations” <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/128834.pdf>

On May 3, 2006, the National Labor Committee (NLC), a New York-based human rights advocacy group, issued a report alleging sweatshop-like conditions in 28 out of 100 Qualified Industrial Zone (QIZ) plants in Jordan. The government subsequently acknowledged that it had failed in some instances to enforce its own labor laws and has taken action since to close down factories in violation of the law. The NLC has recognized the government’s recent actions, though it has suggested that violations of worker rights may continue in smaller factories. Foreign companies with operations inside QIZs must provide food and housing for workers. Conditions in worker dormitories are reportedly inspected by retail garment buyers, and the government provides medical clinics and security for the zones. In 2008, the Jordanian government signed an agreement with the International Labor Organization and International Finance Corporation to establish a voluntary monitoring program to check conditions in close to 100 apparel factories operating in the QIZs. According to Charles Kernaghan of the NLC, “A lot of people seem to be trying to get this thing straight, but in a country where you don’t have a vibrant civil society and unions are not dealing with workers, and workers have virtually no voice, it is going to be problematic.”

2. [If the plan proposes QIZ in Palestinian territories] Prolongs Israeli occupation of Palestinian territory

Link: Further business links between Israel and Palestinian territory risk further entrenching Israel’s occupation

*Sam Bahour 2010 (Palestinian business management consultant living in Ramallah, West Bank, Palestinian territory) 19 Nov 2010* West Bank ‘industrial zones’ <http://jfjfp.com/?p=19122>

The notion that business links will foster peace because the economic returns of cooperation will outweigh the benefits of resistance can only hold if both sides stand to benefit equally from collaboration. For the Palestinians, the benefit is hoped to be economic. For the Israelis, the project is expected to promote a more quiescent opponent; but should the endeavor fail, it is unlikely to exact a heavy economic toll upon Israel. If the industrial zones are to form the basis of the Palestinian economy, the Palestinians, on the other hand, will feel economic pressure to bend to Israel’s will. The project therefore assumes that the Palestinians are the spoilers of the peace process, and that if they can be persuaded to cooperate, a peace deal will be forthcoming. It does not leave room for the possibility that the status quo — separation — is indeed a viable option for Israel. Thus, rather than promoting a final settlement, this industrial zones project risks further entrenching Israel’s occupation.

Link: Palestinian QIZs would normalize Israeli occupation and undermine Palestinian political aspirations

*Sam Bahour 2010 (Palestinian business management consultant living in Ramallah, West Bank, Palestinian territory) 19 Nov 2010* West Bank ‘industrial zones’ <http://jfjfp.com/?p=19122>

Foreigners replaced the Palestinian laborers who previously worked menial jobs in Israel. Foreign workers, however, have proved to be an unsatisfactory solution for Israel, given its overriding prerogative to maintain the Jewish character of the state, as these non-Jewish workers are now attempting to settle permanently. [[7](http://jfjfp.com/?p=19122#_ftn7)] The QIZ scheme would reduce Israel’s dependence on foreign workers by bringing the factories to Palestinian workers now that they are prohibited from traveling to the factories.  
**Movement and Access**As long as Israel controls access and resources in the West Bank, the zones’ operation will remain precarious, perpetually at the mercy of positive relations between Israel and Palestine. Given the existing infrastructure of the West Bank, the water and electricity capacity of these zones will be totally controlled by Israel. Most importantly, Israel will maintain full control of the movement of goods and people between the zones and the outside world. By incorporating Israel’s infrastructure of control within the plans, these projects serve to normalize an illegal occupation and undermine Palestinian political aspirations.

Impact: Palestinians die. Israeli occupation leads to mounting Palestinian death toll

Amnesty International 2014. ( internationally known human rights advocacy non-profit gropu) “Trigger Happy: Israel’s Excessive Use of Force in the West Bank” Feb 2014 <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE15/002/2014/en/349188ef-e14a-418f-ac20-6c9e5c8d9f88/mde150022014en.pdf>

Recent years have seen a mounting toll of deaths and injuries of Palestinians as a result of shooting or other violence by Israeli soldiers outside the context of armed conflict. According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), 27 Palestinians were killed in 2013 by Israeli forces (25 by live ammunition and two by rubber-coated metal bullets). This was 1.5 times the number of those killed in 2011 and 2012 combined; 10 were killed in 2011 (eight by live ammunition, one by a tear gas canister and one following tear gas inhalation) and another eight in 2012 (all by live ammunition) , a total of 18.

3. [If the plan proposes QIZ in Palestinian territories] Zones would hurt Palestinian agriculture

*Sam Bahour 2010 (Palestinian business management consultant living in Ramallah, West Bank, Palestinian territory) 19 Nov 2010* West Bank ‘industrial zones’ <http://jfjfp.com/?p=19122>

Similarly, confiscating agricultural land to make way for large industrial projects not only strips farmers of their livelihoods, but structurally adjusts a key segment of the labor force that, over time, will lose its skills. Agricultural development in Palestine is not in need of a “zone,” but rather requires Israel to comply with international law, to release Palestinian water resources and remove the myriad of access and movement restrictions that do not allow people or products to travel freely within Palestine and abroad. Trying to concentrate agricultural growth in a limited “zone” merely opens the door for farmers outside of the zone to become economically disenfranchised by public policy, instead of being equally supported regardless of their physical location.

4. Loss of human rights and economic regression

QIZs empower government elites, enabling them to centralize control and deny human rights

Prof. Pete Moore 2005. (associate professor of political science at Case Western Reserve Univ) QIZs, FTAs, USAID, and the MEFTA, MIDDLE EAST REPORT, Spring 2005 <http://www.merip.org/mer/mer234/qizs-ftas-usaid-mefta>

Gaining permission to open a QIZ requires permission from several levels of the Jordanian government, as well as permission from Tel Aviv and Washington. Not surprisingly, business elites close to the monarchy and government officials have opened the first zones and have been the most successful. These same elites sit on state policy boards established and appointed by King Abdallah. What US officials seem to ignore is that the monarchy and the “old state sector” are not in opposition; they feed off each other. In the same years these trade arrangements were implemented, government officials in Jordan rolled back political, associative, and press rights in the Kingdom. Government crackdowns have intimidated professional and civil associations to end vocal opposition to the monarchy -- especially as regards its relations with the US and Israel. US aid and trade policies have yielded new patronage resources so the regime can buy off new elites, further centralizing political and economic control. One is left with the conclusion that US trade and aid policy, far from encouraging political change, is actually helping regimes to stymie progress.

Increased dependence on long-distance trade like QIZs increases despotism [tyrannical government] and is bad for economic development and freedom

Prof. Pete Moore 2005. (associate professor of political science at Case Western Reserve Univ) QIZs, FTAs, USAID, and the MEFTA, MIDDLE EAST REPORT, Spring 2005 <http://www.merip.org/mer/mer234/qizs-ftas-usaid-mefta>

In the first place, had Zoellick read his economic history, he would have come across the argument that the Middle East’s dependence on long-distance trade was detrimental to both economic development and political freedom. Long-distance trade is credited with limiting the development of local markets, while the trade revenues accrued to a narrow segment of society, thereby encouraging despotism.  A similar problem haunts Zoellick’s regional strategy. How bilateral FTAs crafted to encourage trade only with the US can be “melded” into intra-regional free trade and local market development is left unexplained. Take Jordan, for example. The original rationale of the QIZs was to encourage trade among Palestinians, Jordan, Israelis and Egyptians. In fact, there is a good argument that Jordan’s QIZs have diverted trade away from the Palestinians.

5. New QIZs will bring lower wages.

Any new QIZs in the Mid-East will take work away from existing QIZs, and new QIZ workers will get lower wages

Prof. Pete Moore 2005. (associate professor of political science at Case Western Reserve Univ) QIZs, FTAs, USAID, and the MEFTA, MIDDLE EAST REPORT, Spring 2005 <http://www.merip.org/mer/mer234/qizs-ftas-usaid-mefta>

When the US-Jordan FTA was signed, much of the fanfare was due to the fact that Jordan was the first Arab FTA. But Jordan is no longer alone. In addition to the deal with Morocco, US officials have now, in December 2004, approved three QIZs for Egypt. Jordanian officials have good reason to fear competition from their much larger and lower-wage neighbors in attracting export industries. Indeed, in the summer of 2004, Egyptian trade officials actually traveled to Jordan seeking to induce Jordanian QIZ managers to defect to the Egyptian zones. Intra-FTA and QIZ proliferation suggests not greater regional cooperation and trade but fierce competition in which success is premised upon lower wages. Since the majority of firms that have moved to the Jordanian zones are foreign garment manufacturers, the game seems to be who can offer the cheapest relocation deal. The rationale for cooperating with other FTA and QIZ countries is absent.