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NEGATIVE BRIEF: Qatar

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**This brief argues against plans that reduce or eliminate US alliance or relationship with Qatar.**

NEGATIVE PHILOSOPHY

Wait and See. We’ve just opened a new chapter in US/Qatari relations with the new government, and Qatar is expanding its commitment to improve relations with the US

Christopher M. Blanchard 2014. (specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs with Congressional Research Service) 4 Nov 2014 Qatar: Background and U.S. Relations <https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL31718.pdf>

The leadership transition in Qatar signaled the opening of a new chapter in U.S.-Qatari relations that already had grown increasingly close in recent years, in spite of some abiding policy differences. Emir Tamim and his government appear to be taking an equally active, if quieter approach to diplomacy than that of the emir’s father and his counterparts. Nevertheless, increasing scrutiny is being applied by some observers to Qatar’s relationships with Islamists and certain armed groups. Most observers expect Qatari policy makers to favor policies that will consolidate the political and economic gains that Qatar has made in recent years and set the country on a sustainable path. Expanding U.S.-Qatari defense relations also may signal a stronger commitment on the part of the new Emir to invest in relations with the United States. Decision makers in the United States appear likely to continue to debate how best to maintain improved defense and counterterrorism relations with Qatar while seeking to address more challenging issues related to regional security, human rights, political reform, and labor conditions.

HARMS / SIGNIFICANCE

Qatar may be engaged with people we don’t like, but it’s because they’re trying to mediate regional conflicts. And they’ve cut ties with Muslim Brotherhood leaders in response to US pressure

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Qatar’s approach to regional affairs can be described as a multi-directional balancing act. To the chagrin of Saudi Arabia and other regional powers, Qatar has sought in recent years to mediate regional conflicts and political disputes by engaging a wide range of parties in Yemen, Lebanon, Sudan, Libya, Egypt, and Gaza, some of whom are hostile to the United States. Qatari leaders responded boldly to the regional unrest that emerged in 2011, and embraced political change that brought Islamist parties to power in Tunisia and Egypt. In the period since, increasing criticism of Qatar by some of the Sunni Arab members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and growing Sunni-Shiite and Arab-Iranian tensions in the Gulf region have led Qatar to close ranks with its neighbors to some degree. Among the key questions for the region is whether or not Qatar's official embrace of some Sunni Islamist movements, including the Muslim Brotherhood, will change significantly under the leadership of Emir Tamim. Several Muslim Brotherhood figures movement left Qatar in 2014 and claim that the government asked them to do so in response to pressure from fellow GCC states Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

Qatar government doesn’t support terrorist organizations and has helped the US fight Islamic State

Christopher M. Blanchard 2014. (specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs with Congressional Research Service) 4 Nov 2014 Qatar: Background and U.S. Relations <https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL31718.pdf>

Qatari officials in public and in private meetings deny supporting extremist groups, and in general terms the Qatari government continues to pursue a foreign policy based on strategic ambiguity and openness to engagement with all actors (including violent armed extremist groups). Emir Tamim said on September 17, “What is happening in Iraq and Syria is extremism and such organizations are partly financed from abroad, but Qatar has never supported and will never support terrorist organizations.” Qatar’s air force participated in coalition military operations against Islamic State targets in Syria in September 2014.The U.S. government has not publicly accused the Qatari state of providing material support to terrorist organizations, but recent U.S. government statements allege that private Qatari citizens and individuals based in Qatar provide such support.

INHERENCY

US government is publicly criticizing Qatar’s support for Hamas and imposing sanctions

Julian Pecquet 2014. (journalist; Congressional Correspondent for Al-Monitor) 10 Sept 2014 Congress Goes After 'Frenemies' Turkey, Qatar“ <http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2014/09/10/congress-goes-after-frenemies-turkey-qatar>

The Treasury Department points out that it has repeatedly — and publicly — denounced Qatar's support for Hamas, notably in a March 4 speech by Undersecretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David Cohen. The department has also sanctioned a number of secondary Qatari and Turkish entities and individuals over the years, notably in the latest round of Iran sanctions announced last month.

US is working with Qatar to fight terrorism financing and progress is being made

Christopher M. Blanchard 2014. (specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs with Congressional Research Service) 4 Nov 2014 Qatar: Background and U.S. Relations <https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL31718.pdf>

In June 2014, the new U.S. Ambassador to Qatar Dana Shell Smith said that the United States government has “an active and productive dialogue with Qatar in the areas of counterterrorism,” adding that “we are working with Qatar to improve the capacity of its counterterrorist financing regime and disrupt illicit cash flows, including through the provision of training.” In her confirmation hearing, Ambassador Shell Smith responded to a question about the status of U.S. efforts to convince Qataris to refrain from supporting extremist groups in Syria by saying, “I haven’t heard from anymore that we’re ready to just declare, you know, everything is wonderful and perfect, but we do feel that we are making progress in our shared understanding of which groups are constitute moderate opposition and who is worthy of our support.”

Qatar has improved its terrorism financing enforcement efforts and is in compliance with US standards

Christopher M. Blanchard 2014. (specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs with Congressional Research Service) 4 Nov 2014 Qatar: Background and U.S. Relations <https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL31718.pdf>

During 2012, the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENAFATF) completed a required review of Qatar after determining that “Qatar had improved its anti-money laundering/combating the financing of terrorism regime and was either ‘Compliant or Largely Compliant’ with all of the Task Force’s recommendations.” The Qatari central bank operates a financial intelligence unit (FIU) that monitors activity in Qatar’s banking system and serves as a liaison office to similar units in the United States and around the world.

We should maintain the close relationship and use it to influence Qatar’s behavior. That’s what worked with Kuwait

Lori Plotkin Boghardt 2014. (fellow in Gulf politics at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy ) Aug 2014 Qatar and ISIS Funding: The U.S. Approach <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/qatar-and-isis-funding-the-u.s.-approach>

To influence Qatar's policies, the United States has employed a carrot-and-stick approach. It heaps praise on its ally for developing new anti-terrorist financing regulations, while privately discouraging and sometimes publicly admonishing its support for terrorist organizations. Yet the fundamental problem is that America's counterterrorism agenda sometimes conflicts with what Qatar perceives to be its own political interests. Qatar's security strategy has been to provide support to a wide range of regional and international groups in order to bolster its position at home and abroad. This strategy has involved generously supporting Islamist organizations, including militant ones like Hamas and the Taliban. Allowing private local fundraising for Islamist groups abroad forms part of this approach. Closing channels of support to militant Islamists -- i.e., what Washington would like Doha to do -- would be inimical to Qatar's basic approach to its own security. American and international pressure has been shown to influence the counter-terrorist financing policies of Gulf states. The case of Kuwait is a recent example. Under significant pressure this year, Kuwait has been strengthening its lax anti-terrorist financing rules. There are even indications that at least some of the new rules will be enforced -- a big issue of concern when it comes to Gulf states. The United States should view its close relationship with Qatar as an avenue through which to influence its ally in a better direction.

SOLVENCY

Focus on Persian Gulf nations won’t solve ISIS financing. Their funding is mostly generated locally in Iraq and Syria

Lori Plotkin Boghardt 2014. (fellow in Gulf politics at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy ) Aug 2014 Qatar and ISIS Funding: The U.S. Approach <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/qatar-and-isis-funding-the-u.s.-approach>

At the same time, financially weakening ISIS demands an approach whose focus is not private Gulf donations. ISIS earns the majority of its income independently -- from oil smuggling, extortion and other crimes in Iraq and Syria. Significantly undermining the group's financial base requires rolling back its access to these local income sources.

DISADVANTAGES

1. Lost influence

Link: US cuts its relations with Qatar. That’s the AFF plan

Link: Qatar occupies a key ideological space in the Islamic world, supporting regional peace, US military operations, and having doors open to many groups

Christopher M. Blanchard 2014. (specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs with Congressional Research Service) 4 Nov 2014 Qatar: Background and U.S. Relations <https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL31718.pdf>

Qatari officials are quick to point out their commitment to the general goal of regional peace and their support for U.S. military operations, even as they maintain ties to Hamas and others critical of Arab-Israeli peace negotiations. In June 2009, U.S. Ambassador to Qatar Joseph LeBaron explained Qatar’s policy in the following terms: “I think of it as Qatar occupying a space in the middle of the ideological spectrum in the Islamic world, with the goal of having doors open to it across that ideological spectrum. They have the resources to accomplish that vision, and that’s rare.”

Impact: Vital diplomatic assistance lost. We need Qatar’s help to resolve numerous foreign policy issues in the Mid East

Kristian C. Ulrichsen 2014. (Middle East fellow at Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy, an associate fellow at Chatham House, visiting fellow at London School of Economics Middle East Center in the United Kingdom; also an affiliate faculty member at the Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies at Univ of Washington–Seattle) 24 Sept 2014 Qatar and the Arab Spring: Policy Drivers and Regional Implications <http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/09/24/qatar-and-arab-spring-policy-drivers-and-regional-implications>

 Qatar’s comparative advantage in mediation is its ability to serve as an intermediary for indirect negotiations and back-channel communications between sworn adversaries and to balance relationships with an array of mutually antagonistic foes.  
 Any return to a policy of quiet backroom diplomacy will strengthen Qatar’s credentials as an effective interlocutor among disputants that cannot easily engage in direct dialogue. Qatar can serve an important role as a back channel to moderate among groups that U.S. officials in particular may not be able to directly reach but whose participation in political processes is nevertheless constructive.  
 Although Qatar is unlikely to fully recover its pre–Arab Spring reputation as a diplomatic mediator, U.S. and Qatari officials should examine how they can engage productively on a range of thorny issues, such as dialogue with Iran on nuclear issues, political stability in Afghanistan following the 2014 withdrawal of international troops, talks with Islamist groups in Syria and Egypt, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

BACKUP EVIDENCE – Lost diplomatic influence

Qatar has gained a reputation as a reliable peace broker

Mehran Kamrava 2011. (Director of the Center for International and Regional Studies at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service in Qatar ) Mediation and Qatari Foreign Policy <http://www18.georgetown.edu/data/people/mk556/publication-61175.pdf>

In a region known for its cross-border crises and intra-national sectarian strife, Qatar has quickly emerged as an actor adept at diffusing and mediating conflicts. Doha’s “niche diplomacy” has led to its reputation as a reliable peace broker. As an integral part of its foreign policy pursuits, Qatar’s insistence on playing a mediating role has, at times, provoked the ire of other regional actors hoping to assume such a role for themselves. For instance, Egypt, which has long viewed itself as Sudan’s primary patron, initially sought to take the initiative away from Qatar in solving the Darfur crisis. In the end, Qatar, with richer pockets and less of a history in relation to Sudan, won out.

Qatari mediation is successful at reducing hostilities in the region

Mehran Kamrava 2011. (Director of the Center for International and Regional Studies at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service in Qatar ) Mediation and Qatari Foreign Policy <http://www18.georgetown.edu/data/people/mk556/publication-61175.pdf>

Ultimately, determining the successes or failures of Qatari mediation depends on the goals and intentions against which the country’s mediators judge themselves. They have, by all accounts, succeeded in negotiating reductions to national and international tensions and reducing the chances of violence. If tension reduction has been the primary goal of Qatari mediation, then in this sense it has been an unqualified success. But if the mediators’ intended purpose has been to resolve the conflicts that they mediate and to foster lasting peace among the disputants, then their record leaves much to be desired. Nevertheless, the important role of Qatari diplomacy in general and its mediation efforts in particular cannot be understated, especially in a region accustomed to diplomatic and domestic tensions and frequent political saber-rattling. Even in those cases where lasting peace is elusive, successful mediation is often measured in terms of the reduction of hostilities rather than the effectiveness of a lasting agreement. As such, Qatari mediation has indeed had a successful record.

Example of success: Qatari intervention helped end the reign of Qadhafi in Libya

Mehran Kamrava 2011. (Director of the Center for International and Regional Studies at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service in Qatar ) Mediation and Qatari Foreign Policy <http://www18.georgetown.edu/data/people/mk556/publication-61175.pdf>

The substance of the country’s mediation efforts may be lacking in depth and long-term resilience, but by its very hyper-activism, Qatar has begun to shape global perceptions of itself as regional peacemaker, an honest broker, a proponent of mediated peace and reconciliation in a region long ravaged by war. In diplomacy, appearances are seldom any less important than substance. These perceptions are only likely to be strengthened by Qatar’s highly visible, and eventually successful, involvement as a major player in the Libyan civil war that ended Colonel Mu‘ammar al-Qadhafi’s decades-long reign. For a small country without a long history of involvement in regional and global affairs, the image of the Qatari flag hoisted by Libyan rebels on Qadhafi’s compound when it was overrun bespeaks the rapid ascent of the small shaykhdom’s popularity and its soft power throughout the Arab world. Mediation has emerged as one of the central tools for enhancing Qatari soft power and global image. On that score, at least insofar as its image is concerned, Qatar’s successes are indeed impressive

2. Lost US business opportunities

Link: The AFF plan puts the United States directly against the Qatar ruling family.

Link: All Qatar investments are owned by the country’s ruling family

WASHINGTON POST 2013. (journalist Marc Fisher) 17 Dec 2013 Qatar is suddenly investing heavily in the U.S., bankrolling D.C.’s City Center, other projects <http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/qatar-is-suddenly-investing-heavily-in-the-us-bankrolling-dcs-city-center-other-projects/2013/12/17/1ffaceca-5c6a-11e3-95c2-13623eb2b0e1_story.html> (brackets in original)

 “Qatar is a family business with a seat at the United Nations,” said [Chase Untermeyer](http://www.untermeyer.com/full_biography), a business consultant who was U.S. ambassador to Qatar under President George W. Bush. “It doesn’t really matter who owns Al Jazeera or Qatari Diar [the state-owned real estate investment company] because it’s all part of the same family business.”

Link: Qatar is investing heavily in U.S. business development

WASHINGTON POST 2013. (journalist Marc Fisher) 17 Dec 2013 Qatar is suddenly investing heavily in the U.S., bankrolling D.C.’s City Center, other projects <http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/qatar-is-suddenly-investing-heavily-in-the-us-bankrolling-dcs-city-center-other-projects/2013/12/17/1ffaceca-5c6a-11e3-95c2-13623eb2b0e1_story.html>

This year, Qatar bought Current TV for $500 million, hired 800 journalists and launched Al Jazeera America, vastly expanding the TV news operation’s presence in the United States. In recent weeks, Qatar Airways announced plans to [expand its U.S. service](http://www.qatarairways.com/english_united_states/press-release.page?pr_id=pressrelease_041213-dallas)in 2014 by adding Dallas, Miami and Philadelphia to a lineup of destinations that includes Houston, Washington, New York and Chicago. And last month, Qatar said it will spend $19 billion to buy 50 Boeing 777 aircraft, part of [a larger deal](http://www.businessweek.com/news/2013-11-18/qatar-emirates-create-purchasing-pact-to-get-most-out-of-boeing)between the U.S. aviation company and Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. The number of Qatari students at U.S. universities has jumped fivefold in the past decade, and the Qatari Foundation International is spending $5 million this year to encourage U.S. schools to teach Arabic. The surge in interest and investment in the United States by one of the world’s smallest countries is raising eyebrows and questions, many of which boil down to, “Why?” The Qataris aren’t saying — the government and three major institutions declined to discuss their U.S. operations — but those who work with the Qataris say the new spending reflects a growing emphasis on boosting return on investment, as well as a desire to diversify a U.S. relationship previously focused on energy and defense.

Impact: Lost jobs and economic growth. Foreign investment creates jobs and grows the economy

Reuters News Service 2012. (journalist Lynn Adler) 10 May 2012 “Job-creating foreign investment in U.S. lags” <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/05/10/us-foreigninvestment-interview-study-idUSBRE84906O20120510>

Foreign investment in the United States is ebbing and beefing it up is critical for economic growth as each job at a foreign company's U.S. unit supports three others, the Organization for International Investment said on Thursday. A complex U.S. tax code and increasing global competition are curbing business development here by foreign companies. That trend is worrisome because foreign firms generally pay salaries to U.S. workers that exceed the industry average. This type of foreign investment, in turn, drives up employment and consumer spending.

3. Lost military contracts

Link: Qatar buys US defense equipment

Christopher M. Blanchard 2014. (specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs with Congressional Research Service) 4 Nov 2014 Qatar: Background and U.S. Relations <https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL31718.pdf>

In November 2013, Qatar Airways signed a letter of intent to purchase 50 additional Boeing 777 airplanes in a deal that may be worth more than $19 billion. As noted above (See “U.S. Military Cooperation and Foreign Assistance”), Qatar’s purchase of U.S. arms and defense equipment also should contribute to an expansion in the value of U.S. exports in coming years.

Link: Qatar buys $11 billion worth of US defense equipment

Christopher M. Blanchard 2014. (specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs with Congressional Research Service) 4 Nov 2014 Qatar: Background and U.S. Relations <https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL31718.pdf>

A series of major proposed U.S. arms sales to Qatar since 2012 has marked a shift in Qatar’s defense planning toward the future use of advanced U.S. attack and transport helicopters and other weapons systems, including items for air defense and missile defense (see Table 2 below). Secretary Hagel visited Doha in July 2014 and announced the sale of more than $11 billion in weapons and air defense systems previously notified to Congress.

Impact: 54,000 US jobs

RT NEWS 2014. US sells $11bn worth of arms to Qatar 15 July 2014 <http://rt.com/news/172804-us-qatar-apache-deal/>

Last December US and Qatar signed a 10-year Defense Cooperation Agreement ensuring presence of American troops at the military installations in the area, including the Combined Air Operations Center at Al Udeid Air Base, and closer interaction between American and Qatari armed forces. The agreement was signed in Qatar by US Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel and Qatari Defense Minister Hamad bin Ali al-Attiyah. *“This is a critically important relationship in the region,”* Kirby said. *“And the secretary is pleased to be able to continue to make it stronger.”* Pentagon claims that new order from Qatar will create 54,000 jobs in the US.

4. Reduced security in the Persian Gulf

Link: US air base at Al-Udeid, Qatar, is the hub of the US Central Command

Christopher M. Blanchard 2014. (specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs with Congressional Research Service) 4 Nov 2014 Qatar: Background and U.S. Relations <https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL31718.pdf>

The Al Udeid airbase now serves as a logistics, command, and basing hub for the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) area of operations. Nearby Camp As Sayliyah houses significant U.S. military equipment pre-positioning and command facilities. Both Qatar and the United States have invested in the construction and expansion of these facilities since the mid-1990s, and they form the main hub of the CENTCOM air and ground logistical network in the region. Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan put U.S. and partner-nation facilities in Qatar to greater use in recent years.

Link: Growing importance of Qatar as a US ally

Omar Ali 2014. (researcher at the Afro-Middle East Centre in Johannesburg, South Africa. He specializes in Middle Eastern politics, with a specific focus on the Gulf Cooperative Council.) 31 Mar 2014 Will the US side with Saudi or Qatar in the Great Gulf Civil War? <http://www.juancole.com/2014/03/saudi-qatar-civil.html>

As for Qatar-US relations, with US-Saudi ties likely to witness a downturn due to future shale gas production in the US, and Qatar housing the US Central Command at its al-Udeid Air Base, Qatar will grow in importance to the US as a regional ally.

Brink: Qatar relationship is critical

Dennis Lynch 2014. (journalist) Qatar And Terrorism: For Better Or For Worse, A Strong Connection 25 Aug 2014 <http://www.ibtimes.com/qatar-terrorism-better-or-worse-strong-connection-1668776> (brackets in original)

More recently, the U.S. signed a [$11 billion arms and defense deal](http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/07/us-strikes-11bn-arms-deal-with-qatar-2014714223825417442.html" \t "_blank) with Qatar for Apache helicopters, missile defense systems and more in July. The U.S. also keeps an Army base and an Air Force base in Qatar. A Pentagon spokesman, Rear Adm. John Kirby, summed up U.S.-Qatari relations in a statement following the deal. He called it “a critically important relationship in the region and [the U.S.] is pleased to be able to continue to make it stronger.”

Link: Qatar is supporting US war on terrorism and Persian Gulf security

Nicola Nasser 2013 (veteran Arab journalist based in Bir Zeit, West Bank of the Israeli-occupied Palestinian territories) January 23, 2013, Global Research, “Qatar, Sponsor of Islamist Political Movements, Major Ally of America,” <http://www.globalresearch.ca/qatar-sponsor-of-islamist-political-movements-major-ally-of-america/5320105>

According to the US State department’s online fact sheet, “bilateral relations are strong,” both countries are “coordinating” diplomatically and “cooperating” on regional security, have a “defense pact,” “ Qatar hosts CENTCOM Forward Headquarters,” and supports NATO and U.S. regional “military operations. Qatar is also an active participant in the U.S.-led efforts to set up an integrated missile defense network in the Gulf region. Moreover, it hosts the U.S. Combined Air Operations Center and three American military bases namely [Al Udeid Air Base](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Al_Udeid_Air_Base" \t "_blank" \o "Al Udeid Air Base), [Assaliyah Army Base](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/As_Saliyah_Army_Base" \t "_blank" \o "As Saliyah Army Base) and [Doha International Air Base](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Doha_International_Air_Base" \t "_blank" \o "Doha International Air Base), which are manned by approximately 5,000 U.S. forces. Seemingly nowadays, Doha and Washington do not see eye to eye on Islamic and Islamist movements, but on the battle grounds of the “war on terror” both capitals could hardly argue that in practice their active roles are not coordinated and do not complement each other.

Link & Brink: Persian Gulf region has threats to stability

Link: World markets react swiftly to real and perceived interruptions to oil supplies

**Notes & Analysis: Even “perceived” interruptions can cause problems in world oil markets. There doesn’t have to be a big war breaking out, just concerns or perceptions can cause oil price impacts. That’s why we need the Carter Doctrine to stabilize the region and minimize the fear of disruptions.**

Lawrence Korb & Ian Moss 2008. (Korb - senior fellow at the Center for American Progress and a senior adviser to the Center for Defense Information; former Assistant Secretary of Defense. Moss - recently was a national security researcher at the Center for American Progress, working with Senior Fellow Lawrence Korb. He earned an M.A. in comparative politics from Northeastern University) “Moving Beyond the Carter Doctrine: Rethinking the U.S. Military Presence in the Persian Gulf” CENTURY FOUNDATION, [http://72.32.39.237:8080/Plone/events/pdfs/ev232/korb.pdf](http://www.google.com/url?q=http%3A%2F%2F72.32.39.237%3A8080%2FPlone%2Fevents%2Fpdfs%2Fev232%2Fkorb.pdf&sa=D&sntz=1&usg=AFQjCNFDwcRJjyi31S8VjtCzwcQE4VYYVQ" \t "_blank)

We know from past and present experience just how swiftly world markets react to real and perceived interruptions to oil supplies. That is one reason why it is in the interest of the United States and the international community to promote and maintain stability in the region where the majority of the world’s chief source of crude oil is produced. The main reason for President Carter’s declaration twenty-eight years ago—fear of encroachment on the Straits of Hormuz by the Soviet Union after its invasion of Afghanistan at the height of the cold war—no longer exists.

Impact: Oil price spikes cause great economic damage

The Economist 2011 (respected British news magazine) March 3, 2011 “The price of fear” THE ECONOMIST <http://www.economist.com/node/18285768>

Nonetheless, whether driven by demand or supply, a large enough spike in the price of oil can do great damage. Economists call such abrupt responses “non-linearities” and they suggest that when the price rises fast enough, consumers and businesses trim their spending and investment plans. This is often because prices are driven by other factors that hurt confidence, such as wide unrest in the Middle East. If another Arab government were toppled, pushing the oil price over $150, the economic impact would almost certainly be larger than the 0.5% to 1% of GDP that simple extrapolation suggests.

Impact: US National security, counter-terrorism efforts, and alliances depend on good relations with Gulf nations, including Qatar

Government Accountability Office 2010. (GAO, an agency of the federal government) 20 Sept 2010 “US Agencies Need to Improve Licensing Data and to Document Reviews of Arms Transfers for U.S. Foreign Policy and National Security Goals” <https://books.google.fr/books?id=pibTlHLJdIgC&pg=PA28&lpg=PA28&dq=qatar+security+%22persian+gulf%22+CENTCOM&source=bl&ots=pShdjFcMQE&sig=PkhTzJn8Byr3o49Z8RTYKO1CGaY&hl=en&sa=X&ei=qz-oVJbbIsaAU-3zg7gL&ved=0CCYQ6AEwATgK#v=onepage&q=qatar%20security%20%22persian%20gulf%22%20CENTCOM&f=false>



6. Weakens the war on the Islamic State

Link: US depends on Qatar air base to bomb the Islamic State

WASHINGTON POST 2014 (journalist Chaig Whitlock) U.S. relies on Persian Gulf bases for airstrikes in Iraq 26 Aug 2014 <http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-relies-on-persian-gulf-bases-for-airstrikes-in-iraq/2014/08/25/517dcde0-2c7a-11e4-9b98-848790384093_story.html>

Public records and U.S. military statements about the types of U.S. aircraft deployed over Iraq indicate that they are primarily drawn from three major bases in the gulf: al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, Ali al Salem Air Base in Kuwait and al Dhafra Air Base in the United Arab Emirates. In addition, Predator drones and possibly other U.S. aircraft are flying from Incirlik Air Base in Turkey, a NATO ally. Those bases are responsible for launching about two-thirds of the airstrikes in Iraq since Aug. 8, as well as a similar proportion of the thousands of surveillance sorties that have been conducted since June, according to U.S. military commanders. The remainder have been launched from the USS George H.W. Bush, an aircraft carrier in the Persian Gulf, and other ships in the carrier’s strike group, according to Navy commanders. The Pentagon has become increasingly dependent on the tiny gulf states to host the bulk of its forces­ in the Middle East since it withdrew from Iraq in 2011 and vacated several large bases there. Mustafa Alani, director of security and defense studies at the Gulf Research Center in Geneva, said that gulf countries generally support U.S. military action against the Islamic State, the jihadist movement that has taken over large parts of Iraq and Syria.

Impact: Islamic State is terrible

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 2014. (journalist Michael Holtz) 2 Oct 2014 UN report spotlights 'staggering' Islamic State atrocities in Iraq <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2014/1002/UN-report-spotlights-staggering-Islamic-State-atrocities-in-Iraq> (brackets in original)

The group, which is fighting in Iraq and Syria, has carried out a wide range of atrocities, including mass executions, abductions, rape and other forms of sexual and physical violence against women and children, the UN said.  A joint statement by the UN's mission in Iraq and its human rights commission said 9,347 Iraqi civilians had died in the conflict. Another 17,386 had been injured.  “The array of violations and abuses perpetrated by [Islamic State] and associated armed groups is staggering, and many of their acts may amount to war crimes or crimes against humanity,” said UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein.