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NEGATIVE BRIEF: ICITAP (Police Training) - bad

By Vance Trefethen

ICITAP (INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE TRAINING ASSISTANCE PROGRAM) is a program run by the U.S. Dept. of Justice. It gives training to foreign police departments to try to make them more professional and effective.

SOLVENCY

1. US Capabilities lacking.

US does not have the capacity to provide immediate and coordinated police training

Col. Dennis E. Keller 2010. (retired US Army colonel; contract faculty instructor for the Dept of Distance Education, U.S. Army War College, responsible for the development of the online regional studies course for the Americas region; worked with El Salvadoran Armed Forces on operational level psychological operations, and provided direct support to the El Salvadoran Armed Forces’ counterinsurgency operations ) Aug 2010 "U.S. Military Forces and Police Assistance in Stability Operations: The Least-Worst Option to Fill the U.S. Capacity Gap” [www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1013](http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1013)

“Establishing an effective local police force is one of the most critical elements of successful counterinsurgency (COIN) and stability operations, but it is a task for which the U.S. Government is the least prepared and capable. The establishment of an effective police force is critical to security sector reform, justice sector reform, and the successful transition to the host nation’s security forces. But the United States lacks the institutional capacity to provide an immediate and coordinated civilian police training and advisory effort, particularly in a failed or fragile state.”

US doesn't have the skills - we are unprepared to assist national-level police forces overseas

Col. Dennis E. Keller 2010. (retired US Army colonel; contract faculty instructor for the Department of Distance Education, U.S. Army War College where he is responsible for the development of the online regional studies course for the Americas region; worked with the El Salvadoran Armed Forces on operational level psychological operations, and provided direct support to the El Salvadoran Armed Forces’ counterinsurgency operations ) August 2010 "U.S. Military Forces and Police Assistance in Stability Operations: The Least-Worst Option to Fill the U.S. Capacity Gap" <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1013>

“To combat these high-end threats, the stability police undertake such tasks as conducting complex investigations of criminal and terrorist groups, special weapons and tactics to arrest heavily armed criminal and terrorist suspects, hostage rescue, and crowd and riot control in response to major civil disturbances, and intelligence collection. One challenge for U.S. stability operations is the lack of an equivalent stability police force in the United States. The United States does not have a federal police force as such for the domestic tasks mentioned above. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) limits itself to criminal investigation tasks and arrest of high-threat criminals or terrorists, but does not perform crowd and riot control, for example. The decentralized domestic U.S. police force structure, lacking a stability mission, leaves U.S. agencies operating overseas unpracticed and thus somewhat unprepared to assist and advise a national level or federal stability police force elsewhere. Other nations do have the equivalent of a stability police force such as the Italian Carabinieri, the French Gendarmerie, the Spanish Guardia Civil, and the Argentinean Gendarmeria Nacional.”

US doesn't have good experience with foreign law enforcement programs

Dr. Terrence K. Kelly 2006. (Ph.D. in mathematics, M.S. in computer and systems engineering, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute; M.A. in strategic studies, U.S. Army War College; B.S., United States Military Academy, West Point) Options for Transitional Security Capabilities for America, 2006, (brackets added; parentheses in original) <http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/2006/RAND_TR353.pdf>

The United States faces certain challenges in determining how best to provide a TLE [transitional law enforcement] capability. The U.S. federal structure does not naturally provide for such a lead (as found in the national police forces of many other countries). Moreover, the prospect of military forces taking on this mission is politically sensitive because of the unfortunate U.S. experience during the Cold War in training security forces in South and Central America. As a result, American participation in TLE efforts has generally been as part of an international effort, usually slow in getting into the country and initially lacking in capability because policing responsibilities are contracted out to officers who come as individuals rather than as police units with a common culture, doctrine, and capabilities.

2. Government corruption

Link: Middle East countries are corrupt

Mehkrunisa Qayyum 2013. (founder of PITAPOLICY Consulting) 17 Dec 2013 Middle East and North Africa: Holding Public and Private Corruption Accountable <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mehrunisa-qayyum/middle-east-north-africa-_b_4432902.html>

In early December, Transparency International, a German-based non-profit, shared its [yearly assessment of countries' public sector corruption,](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/12/03/corruption-perceptions-index_n_4377010.html" \t "_hplink) 'Perceived Corruption Index.' English and [Arab media commented on the weaker performance of the MENA region](http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/12/five-arab-states-top-most-corrupt-list-201312353328911685.html" \t "_hplink) compared to other regions. "Perceived" makes sense given that corruption negatively affects business, just as business negatively affects government all in the name of "getting things done." Also, corruption goes beyond the government sector too. As UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon wrote, "Corruption is also rife in the world of sport and business, and in public procurement processes," in a [Daily News Egypt op-ed](http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2013/12/09/message-on-international-anti-corruption-day/" \t "_hplink). More on this point to follow. Out of 177 countries, none of the Middle East and North Africa countries ranked in the top 25. Here is a sample of where some MENA countries ranked in 2013: United Arab Emirates - 26th  
Qatar - 28th  
Israel - 36th  
Turkey -53rd  
Bahrain-57th  
Oman - 61st  
Saudi Arabia - 63rd  
Jordan - 66th  
Kuwait - 69th  
Tunisia - 77th  
Morocco - 91st  
Algeria - 94th  
Egypt - 114th  
Lebanon - 127th  
Syria -168th

Impact: ICITAP fails when the local courts are corrupt - Example: Bosnia

Robert M. Perito 2007. (former deputy director of ICITAP; currently senior program officer at the United States Institute of Peace. He joined the Institute after a distinguished career in the U.S. Foreign Service; former deputy executive secretary of the National Security Council in the White House) August 2007 U.S. Police in Peace and Stability Operations, <https://www.google.fr/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CCEQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.usip.org%2Fsites%2Fdefault%2Ffiles%2Fsr191.pdf&ei=y76dVJXfNYmvabv3gvgC&usg=AFQjCNFzaYhCJKY9YSt1e5Hs07ce-Q7c2A&sig2=VktiV0c_8ADAfPBjJkwUuA&bvm=bv.82001339,d.d2s>

In Bosnia the United States launched a comprehensive assistance effort to rebuild the local police. This program was conducted by ICITAP, which trained and equipped local police directly or provided curriculum and equipment to the IPTF, which trained the Bosnians. The aim of the police assistance program was to create a community-oriented police force that abided by democratic standards and observed and protected human rights. Over time this U.S.-led effort created police organizations in Bosnia that effectively controlled street crime. The police program was not matched, however, by an equal effort to reconstitute the other parts of the judicial system, courts, and prisons. As a result the police were unable to deal with organized crime, which turned Bosnia into a criminalized state over time.

3. Unqualified personnel

They're Bingo Grannies with a license to kill. Former deputy director of ICITAP Robert Perito in 2004 said:

Robert Perito 2004. (former deputy director of ICITAP; currently senior program officer at the United States Institute of Peace. He joined the Institute after a distinguished career in the U.S. Foreign Service; former deputy executive secretary of the National Security Council in the White House) interview with Joanne Myers with the Carnegie Council, 10 Mar 2004, <https://www.carnegiecouncil.org/studio/multimedia/20040310/4427.html?withOthers=1>

The United States is the only country in the world today that uses civilian contractors as police in international interventions. The State Department just signed a $1.7 billion contract with DynCorp to provide civilian police to Iraq. What kinds of folks do we get when we send out a private U.S. corporation to hire police to go to foreign countries? Largely retirees, and a lot of people who need to get out of town. The first contingent to Bosnia was rounded up very quickly, flown up to New York as a group, and then put through a three-day orientation program while the company conducted background checks. At the end of the three-day period, 50 percent of the people had failed the checks. The current training program is going to raise 1,500 police officers to go to Iraq. One of the women who participated in the training came back and said, “They’re really sweet people. They have a lot of gray hair. The women look like bingo grannies.” They were probably police officers at some point in their career but are no longer serving in that capacity. If I told you that the United States needed a military contingent to go to Sierra Leone tomorrow and the U.S. military was stretched a bit thin, and so I was going to go out and advertise for guys who used to be soldiers to show up, put them in uniform and give them M-16s, license to kill and pack them off to Sierra Leone as the U.S. military contingent, you would think, “You’re nuts.” But we do that with police every day.

4. No host country agreement

Link: Affirmative never proves the host country wants the program or that their police forces would welcome US influence

Link: It's very hard to influence the police forces of a foreign culture

Col. Dennis E. Keller 2010. (retired US Army colonel; contract faculty instructor for the Department of Distance Education, U.S. Army War College where he is responsible for the development of the online regional studies course for the Americas region; worked with the El Salvadoran Armed Forces on operational level psychological operations, and provided direct support to the El Salvadoran Armed Forces’ counterinsurgency operations ) August 2010 "U.S. Military Forces and Police Assistance in Stability Operations: The Least-Worst Option to Fill the U.S. Capacity Gap" <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1013>

Influencing the organizational culture is one of the most difficult challenges even an insider can take on. But an outside advisor from another culture will find the task doubly difficult. However, shaping the organizational culture is the very task demanded in stabilization operations as it relates to local police forces. The advisor must identify and understand key aspects of both the organizational culture of the unit to which he is assigned and the local societal culture in which his unit operates. The advisor must not only evaluate his unit from the point of view of his own experience and his nation’s policy goals, but also from the perspective of local societal values. An advisor can make the strongest argument for change when he can identify significant divergence between the values of the police unit and those of the local society. He can encourage a change in values that both enhances the norms required for community policing, and brings the local police subculture into greater harmony with the local society. This approach contrasts markedly with feckless insistence that a change in policing methods should be made because “this is the way it is done in the United States.”

Impact: Host nation must have the will to reform its police force in order for it to work

Col. Dennis E. Keller 2010. (retired US Army colonel; contract faculty instructor for the Department of Distance Education, U.S. Army War College where he is responsible for the development of the online regional studies course for the Americas region; worked with the El Salvadoran Armed Forces on operational level psychological operations, and provided direct support to the El Salvadoran Armed Forces’ counterinsurgency operations ) August 2010 "U.S. Military Forces and Police Assistance in Stability Operations: The Least-Worst Option to Fill the U.S. Capacity Gap" <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1013>

The political leadership of the host nation must have the political consensus and will to support a reformed local police force. Where ethnic conflict or ideological divisions fracture the political leadership, political factions may attempt to control local police to further their own ethnic or electoral ends, rather than serve the local community. Local societal values of the host nation may be vastly different from those of Western cultures, and may tolerate or even encourage more authoritarian local law enforcement as opposed to a community-based approach, especially where the population is harassed by spiking crime rates.

5. Bad management

Link: No effective oversight, no coherent vision

Col. Dennis E. Keller 2010. (retired US Army colonel; contract faculty instructor for the Department of Distance Education, U.S. Army War College where he is responsible for the development of the online regional studies course for the Americas region; worked with the El Salvadoran Armed Forces on operational level psychological operations, and provided direct support to the El Salvadoran Armed Forces’ counterinsurgency operations ) August 2010 "U.S. Military Forces and Police Assistance in Stability Operations: The Least-Worst Option to Fill the U.S. Capacity Gap" <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1013> (brackets added)

Police training is authorized by so many exceptions and specific pieces of legislation over the years since 1975 that it has become impossible to accurately account for money spent, identify all extant police programs, or even list all Section 660 exemptions. This patchwork of legislation has resulted in a diverse array of USG [U.S. government] agencies becoming involved in justice sector reform, thus generating rivalries and turf wars which have yet to be satisfactorily resolved. As a result, there is no positive institutional mandate for foreign police assistance, no effective oversight of funding, and no coherent vision for police assistance programs.

Impact: Law enforcement intervention requires effective management in order to work

**(TLE = Transitional Law Enforcement)**

Carr Trevillian, Deputy Director, ICITAP, July 28, 2005, the "Senior Dept of Justice official" quoted by Dr. Terrence K. Kelly. (Kelly: Ph.D. in mathematics, M.S. in computer and systems engineering, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute; M.A. in strategic studies, U.S. Army War College; B.S., United States Military Academy, West Point) Options for Transitional Security Capabilities for America, 2006, <http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/2006/RAND_TR353.pdf> (brackets, ellipses and parentheses in original)

In the words of one senior DoJ official: Historically, the international community has failed or been less than effective in post conﬂict situations because it has ... [stovepiped] the various “civilian police” missions. From the day a TLE force hits the ground, development and possibly training (in the form of [on-the-job training]) starts. While the TLE may be dealing with security issues on the ground ... someone must be managing the process of evaluating/assessing the capabilities of the indigenous force and making decisions about how to proceed programmatically ... to ensure the development of sustainable law enforcement institutions. Additionally there are often U.S. law enforcement operational and national security interests that must also be dealt with.... So, from day one potentially you have the need for a TLE, development/training experts, and operational law enforcement capabilities. In order for all three of these “police missions” to work there must be a seamless management structure and integrated command and control structures.

Bad Management: US Police training programs lack management, procedural, and assessment programs

Col. Dennis E. Keller 2010. (retired US Army colonel; contract faculty instructor for the Department of Distance Education, U.S. Army War College where he is responsible for the development of the online regional studies course for the Americas region; worked with the El Salvadoran Armed Forces on operational level psychological operations, and provided direct support to the El Salvadoran Armed Forces’ counterinsurgency operations ) August 2010 "U.S. Military Forces and Police Assistance in Stability Operations: The Least-Worst Option to Fill the U.S. Capacity Gap" <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1013> (brackets added)

The lack of a lead agency with overall responsibility for foreign police training, similar to DoD’s [Department of Defense] responsibility for foreign military training, carries with it a number of adverse consequences. The USG [U.S. Government] has no equivalent to the International Military Education and Training (IMET) Program to systematically bring police officers to the United States for training, such as DoD has for foreign military officers. The USG does not have a comprehensive assessment program, though one is in development, to identify the state of law enforcement and police in a foreign country. The USG has not developed what the military would call “doctrine,” or agreed-upon and binding procedures and principles, to integrate State INL’s emphasis on the enforcement aspect of police training with USAID’s community policing and overall justice sector and ministerial reform programs.

ICITAP is caught in bureaucratic conflicts between Department of State, US Agency for International Development, and Dept of Justice

Col. Dennis E. Keller 2010. (retired US Army colonel; contract faculty instructor for the Department of Distance Education, U.S. Army War College where he is responsible for the development of the online regional studies course for the Americas region; worked with the El Salvadoran Armed Forces on operational level psychological operations, and provided direct support to the El Salvadoran Armed Forces’ counterinsurgency operations ) August 2010 "U.S. Military Forces and Police Assistance in Stability Operations: The Least-Worst Option to Fill the U.S. Capacity Gap" <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1013> (brackets added)

[Department of ] State and USAID officials were concerned with some ICITAP internal management problems, which were the subject of a DoJ Inspector General investigation in 1997 and have since been resolved. An interagency committee consisting of DoS, DoJ, and USAID met in August 1998 to review ICITAP operations, but DoJ did not support the committee’s draft report. However, ICITAP did implement many of the recommendations in the draft report. The strains between these three agencies concerning foreign law enforcement programs continue to this day.

6. Training evaporates. After the US trainer leaves, the local police revert to their old ways

Col. Dennis E. Keller 2010. (retired US Army colonel; contract faculty instructor for the Department of Distance Education, U.S. Army War College where he is responsible for the development of the online regional studies course for the Americas region; worked with the El Salvadoran Armed Forces on operational level psychological operations, and provided direct support to the El Salvadoran Armed Forces’ counterinsurgency operations ) August 2010 "U.S. Military Forces and Police Assistance in Stability Operations: The Least-Worst Option to Fill the U.S. Capacity Gap" <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1013>

“U.S. police assistance efforts generally focus on establishing a centralized police academy where new or recycled police officers receive training in the basic skills of police work. These academies do go beyond the mere technical fundamentals of police work, including courses on respect for human rights, acceptable and humane interrogation techniques, the rights of the individual under the host nation’s system of law, as well as other issues of correct police behavior. Police trainers then often visit local police units and provide refresher and reinforcement training on these skills and values. However, when the police officer leaves the academy, or the police trainer on a temporary mission to a police force departs, the organizational culture of the police force tends to reassert itself, again becoming the dominant factor in determining a policeman’s behavior towards the local population.”

7. Contractors are not effective.

US uses contractors for police training, and several factors block contractors' effectiveness in police training

Col. Dennis E. Keller 2010. (retired US Army colonel; contract faculty instructor for the Department of Distance Education, U.S. Army War College where he is responsible for the development of the online regional studies course for the Americas region; worked with the El Salvadoran Armed Forces on operational level psychological operations, and provided direct support to the El Salvadoran Armed Forces’ counterinsurgency operations ) August 2010 "U.S. Military Forces and Police Assistance in Stability Operations: The Least-Worst Option to Fill the U.S. Capacity Gap" <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1013> (brackets added)

“Simply using a contracting mechanism to conduct police training does not create the kind of institutional capacity in the USG [U.S. Government] that is required for a consistently effective approach to enabling local police to establish and maintain a safe and secure environment in a recovering state. Contracted police trainers often cannot or will not operate in nonpermissive environments, thus confining their training to the capital city or secure areas while leaving unsecured remoter areas of a country without desperately needed police trainers and mentors, as is often the case in Iraq and Afghanistan today. Moreover, if a particular contracted police trainer/mentor is identified as having superior ability to impart police skills and values in a foreign environment, there is no mechanism to keep that person on at DoS INL or elsewhere in the USG to help establish institutional knowledge and long-term capacity to manage and conduct foreign police training.

Backup evidence: We don't have adequate personnel, so we have to use contractors for ICITAP and other police training programs

**(AFF cannot fiat that they won't use contractors; without contractors the plan never takes effect at all because the government personnel to do the plan don't exist). That means contractor problems -- delays and restrictions on their work -- will happen.**

Col. Dennis E. Keller 2010. (retired US Army colonel; contract faculty instructor for the Department of Distance Education, U.S. Army War College where he is responsible for the development of the online regional studies course for the Americas region; worked with the El Salvadoran Armed Forces on operational level psychological operations, and provided direct support to the El Salvadoran Armed Forces’ counterinsurgency operations ) August 2010 "U.S. Military Forces and Police Assistance in Stability Operations: The Least-Worst Option to Fill the U.S. Capacity Gap" <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1013>

As a result, responsibility for foreign police assistance is now shared primarily among DoS INL, DoJ ICITAP and OPDAT, and USAID, but other agencies such as DHS CBP and FLETC also have pieces of the foreign police training action. Each new police assistance program requires new and unique funding and a new interagency agreement for implementation. Once these arrangements are made, the lack of active federal employees or standing reserve arrangements for civilian police trainers requires that a contract be developed and bid to provide the necessary civilian police personnel, creating further delays in the arrival of assistance for host nation police forces. Once the contracted police trainers finally arrive in country, numerous contract and security restrictions may prevent their deployment to nonpermissive regions where police assistance is most critically needed.

DISADVANTAGES

1. Incompetence backfires.

Our incompetent efforts delay real solutions and encourage the local population to support terrorists and criminals

Col. Dennis E. Keller 2010. (retired US Army colonel; contract faculty instructor for the Department of Distance Education, U.S. Army War College where he is responsible for the development of the online regional studies course for the Americas region; worked with the El Salvadoran Armed Forces on operational level psychological operations, and provided direct support to the El Salvadoran Armed Forces’ counterinsurgency operations ) August 2010 "U.S. Military Forces and Police Assistance in Stability Operations: The Least-Worst Option to Fill the U.S. Capacity Gap" <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1013> (brackets added)

Unfortunately, the USG [U.S. Government] currently lacks the institutional capacity to make an immediate and coordinated civilian police training and advisory effort, especially in a nonpermissive security environment in a failed or fragile state. The resultant delays in addressing problems in host nation police forces, or forming and training new police forces, only extend the time required to establish the security needed to reinvigorate the governance and economic sectors; in a worst-case scenario, incompetent, corrupt and abusive local police may even encourage the local population’s support of insurgents, terrorist groups, or organized criminal networks.

2. Stability & Democracy undermined

Link: Middle East countries are a long way from establishing functioning democracies

Dr. Ted Galen Carpenter 2007. (PhD in diplomatic history; senior fellow for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute.) 13 Aug 2007 “Democracy and Demagoguery in the Middle East” <http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/democracy-demagoguery-middle-east>

That is not to say that Middle Eastern societies will never be ready to implement Western-style liberal democracy. There is no anti-democracy gene in human DNA. Societies change over time, and the emergence of stable, liberal democratic systems in the Middle East might well occur at some point in the future. But it’s not likely to happen in the next generation or two, and for the president to base U.S. policy in the region on the expectation that it will is irresponsible.

Impact: Helping police forces before democratic institutions are established undermines stability & democracy

Prof. Stephen Hill, Prof. Randall Beger and Prof. John Zanetti 2007. (Stephen M. Hill Associate-Professor, Dept. of Political Science, University of Wisconsin-Eau Claire Randall R. Beger Professor, Dept. of Political Science University of Wisconsin-Eau Claire John M. Zanetti II Graduate, Dept. of Political ScienceUniversity of Wisconsin-Eau Claire) Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, April 2007 "Questioning the Rise of Paramilitary Policing in US Domestic and Foreign Policy" <http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/1/9/9/2/6/pages199266/p199266-13.php>

The first era of US involvement in supporting the creation of paramilitary police forces abroad may also hold lessons for the increasing tendency of the US to support their creation today. In the often chaotic and crime-ridden environments of post-conflict societies, the temptation may be to create paramilitary police forces before the democratic institutions of state are properly established. As the recent example of Iraq indicates, the creation of paramilitary forces can still undermine the long-term goal of providing stability and democratization to conflict ridden countries if they are tainted by individuals with inappropriate loyalties or become politicized by newly formed interior ministries (Moss, 2006; 6).

3. Increased corruption. Training police is a bad idea in a nation where corruption is rampant - it will simply make corrupt police more efficient at being bad

Link: Mid-East governments are corrupt. Cross-apply SOLVENCY-2 card.

Link & Impact: Giving bad police forces more training only makes them more competent thugs

Col. Dennis E. Keller 2010. (retired US Army colonel; contract faculty instructor for the Department of Distance Education, U.S. Army War College where he is responsible for the development of the online regional studies course for the Americas region; worked with the El Salvadoran Armed Forces on operational level psychological operations, and provided direct support to the El Salvadoran Armed Forces’ counterinsurgency operations ) August 2010 "U.S. Military Forces and Police Assistance in Stability Operations: The Least-Worst Option to Fill the U.S. Capacity Gap" <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1013>

Normative standards are more critical than technical skills for community-based policing.Most initial police training, even by civilian police trainers, tends to focus on technical police skills imparted at a centralized police academy. While such training is critical to develop more-competent police, community-based policing, which depends on a positive, mutually reinforcing relationship between local police and the community they serve, will not happen without reform of abusive and corrupt police practices. The normative principles required for effective community-based policing include responsiveness to the local community, accountability to the rule of law, defense of human rights, and transparency to scrutiny from outside the police institution. Improving the technical skills of a local police force without concomitant normative reforms only creates more competent thugs.

4. Stabilization turns into oppression.

US police aid to "maintain stability" has historically turned into helping dictators instead of protecting democracy

Robert Perito 2004. (former deputy director of ICITAP; currently senior program officer at the United States Institute of Peace. He joined the Institute after a distinguished career in the U.S. Foreign Service; former deputy executive secretary of the National Security Council in the White House) interview with Joanne Myers with the Carnegie Council, 10 Mar 2004, <https://www.carnegiecouncil.org/studio/multimedia/20040310/4427.html?withOthers=1>

Secondly, when we got into the business of policing states in the Caribbean at the turn of the 20th century, our solution to the problem of how to maintain stability in these cases was almost every time to create a constabulary force. In 1898 in Cuba after the Spanish-American War, in the Province of Santiago, there was general chaos, a typical post-conflict environment. U.S. troops were still there, but there was tremendous pressure on the part of the Congress and the public to bring the American army home. A Marine Corps general named Leonard Wood came up with the idea of organizing a Cuban constabulary with U.S. officers and Cubans who would be both a police and military force to police Cuba. And then, in turn, we created the same kinds of institutions in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Panama and Nicaragua. The sad and tragic fact is that in almost every case these organizations, which were supposed to protect democracy, turned into forces of autocracy, and the people that came out of there—Somoza, Trujillo, Noriega—were dictators that we subsequently took down.

5. Wrong missions.

US strategies on police training leave local police incapable of protecting communities from violence. The impact: It undermines effective governance and economic development

Col. Dennis E. Keller 2010. (retired US Army colonel; contract faculty instructor for the Department of Distance Education, U.S. Army War College where he is responsible for the development of the online regional studies course for the Americas region; worked with the El Salvadoran Armed Forces on operational level psychological operations, and provided direct support to the El Salvadoran Armed Forces’ counterinsurgency operations ) August 2010 "U.S. Military Forces and Police Assistance in Stability Operations: The Least-Worst Option to Fill the U.S. Capacity Gap" <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1013> (brackets added)

While significant effort in many stabilization operations has gone into honing the high-end police skills of national level stabilization police forces or training local police forces in these high-end skills, less attention has been given to developing effective community-based policing skills and norms among local police, who will remain with their communities after a sufficient degree of civil security has been established. In fact, a current criticism of police training in Iraq and Afghanistan is that both national and regional police forces have been used as supplements to these nations’ military forces in COIN [Counter-Insurgency] operations, and have even been described as “low-cost trigger pullers.” The subordination of policing to COIN has left local and regional police incapable of protecting local communities from sectarian and criminal violence. The failure to orient local police forces to provide routine law enforcement and public-safety to local communities leaves a security vacuum in these communities which over the long term will undermine the state’s legitimacy and its ability to establish effective governance and economic development.